VP-94 History
Circa 1946
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Dad flew in Squadron VP-94 from the time it was formed in early 1942 (I believe), till when it was de-commissioned in 1946. He actually helped organize a couple of squadron reunions, including one in the past few years where pilots from "old" VP-94 got together at the Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, and the Navy flew in a P-3 from NAS New Orleans, Louisiana from the "new" VP-94..." Contributed by Tim Daugherty timd2@ix.netcom.com
Circa 1945
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Full Text Citations For Award of The Navy Cross - To U.S. Navy Personnel - World War II - (2,889 Awards) - Navy Cross Citations U.S. Navy - World War II..." WebSite: Home of Heros http://www.homeofheroes.com/ valor/ 1_Citations/ 03_wwii-nc/nc_06wwii_navyH.html [19NOV2007]
HEIM, CARL F., JR.
Synopsis:
The Navy Cross is presented to Carl F. Heim, Ensign, U.S. Navy (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism in action on 28 July 1945, while serving with Patrol Squadron 94 (VP-94), deployed over the Inland Sea of Japan. His outstanding courage and determined skill were at all times inspiring and in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
Circa 1944
A BIT OF HISTORY: VP-94 History "...VP-94 sitting on the steps of their headquarters in NAF Belem, Brazil during WWII Circa 1944. The photo was from the wartime photo collection of PH1 Fountia G. Wetzel. FRONT CENTER: Joe the Monkey. FRONT ROW L TO R: Mike Argento, John Daugherty, Carl Spaeth, Dick Rowland, Dick Craig, Harold Swenson (Skipper), John Banta, next 3 unknown and Clancy Armenake. MIDDLE ROW L TO R: Dave Watrous, unknown, Ray Addington and rest unknown on that row. STANDING: far right – Whitey Ransford. Hopefully, someone else may recognize more of the men in the photo and identify them..." Contributed by Bill Bray rebuzno@aol.com [08JAN2015]
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...History of FAW-11 - History from 00AUG42-00DEC44 - Submitted December 19th, 1944. Squadron's Assigned: VP-31, VP-32, VP-53, VP-74, VP-81, VP-83, VP-92, VP-94, VP-98, VP-99, VP-130, VP-131, VP-133, VP-141, VP-147, VP-204, VP-205, VP-212, VP-213, VP-214 and VP-215..." Official U. S. Navy Records (National Archives and Records Administration) via Fold3 http://www.fold3.com/ [04DEC2012]
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 11 Jan 1944..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [29SEP2006]
VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED
VD-1, VD-2, VD-3 and VD-4
VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-7, VJ-8, VJ-9, VJ-10, VJ-11, VJ-12, VJ-13, VJ-14, VJ-15, and VJ-16
VP-6 Coast Guard
VP-11, VP-12, VP-13, VP-14, VP-15, VP-16, VP-17, VP-18 and VP-19
VP-20, VP-23 and VP-24
VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34
VP-43, VP-44 and VP-45
VP-52 and VP-54
VP-61 and VP-62
VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74
VP-81 and VP-84
VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94
VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109
VP-110, VP-111, VP-112, VP-113, VP-115, VP-116 and VP-117
VP-126, VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129
VP-130, VP-131, VP-132, VP-133, VP-134, VP-135, VP-136, VP-137, VP-138 and VP-139
VP-140, VP-141, VP-142, VP-143, VP-144, VP-145, VP-146, VP-147, VP-148 and VP-149
VP-150 and VP-151
VP-201, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-208 and VP-209
VP-210, VP-211, VP-212, VP-213, VP-214, VP-215 and VP-216
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Addendum to Narrative History of Patrol Bombing Squadron NINETY-FOUR-22 December 1944" Contributed by John B. Sargent jbsarg@Juno.com [10JUN98]
From: Commander Patrol Bombing Squadron NINETY-FOUR To: History Unit, Op-33-J-6, Office of Editorial Research. Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air Wing FIVE (2) Commander Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
Subject Addendum to Narrative History of Patrol Bombing Squadron NINETY-FOUR; Forwarding of.
Reference: (a) Aviation Circular Letter No.74-44 of 26 July 1944. (b) Manual for Historical Officers, NavAer 00-25Q-26
Enclosures: (A) Subject History. (B) Reference (b) (C) Two (2) Brazilian newspapers dated 12 December 1944.
1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosures (A) through (C) are forwarded herewith. H.R. SWENSON VP-94 HISTORY CHRONOLOGY CONFIDENTIAL-DECLASSIFIED
Date of Origin: 3 March 1942 Commanding Officers: Lieutenant Commander David William Shafer, USN, Altoona, Pennsylvania. Commanded 3 March 1942 to 26 November 1942. Lieutenant Joseph Bonafield Tibbets, USN, Alexandria, Louisiana. Commanded 26 November 1942 to 12 November 1943. Promoted to Lieutenant Commander 1 May 1943. Lieutenant Commander Harold Robert Swenson, USNR, 77393, Stockton, California. Commanding since 12 November 1943
Commands Served Under: Eastern Sea Frontier 3 March 1942 to 16 January 1943. Fleet Air Wing Eleven 18 January 1943 to 10 April 1943. Fleet Air Wing Sixteen 10 April to present.
Squadron Movements: 18 May 1942. Norfolk, Virginia to Quonset Point, Rhode Island. 31 May 1942 Quonset Point to Jacksonville, Florida. Six planes remained at Quonset as a detachment. 10 June 1942. Detachment of three planes moved from Jacksonville to Charleston, South Carolina. 14 June 1942. Detachment at Quonset Point moved to Jacksonville. 1 September 1942 Detachment of two planes moved from Jacksonville to Cherry Point, North Carolina. 1 September 1942 Detachment of four planes were moved from Jacksonville to Cherry Point. 14 January 1943 Detachments at Cherry Point and Charleston returned to Jacksonville. 16 January 1943 Commenced movement from Jacksonville to Natal, Brazil where administrative headquarters were established 20 January 1943 18 June 1943. Detachment of six planes moved from Natal to Belem, Brazil. 24 June 1943. Detachment of three aircraft moved from Natal to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 25 June 1943. Detachment of one aircraft moved from Natal to Rio de Janeiro. 13 July 1943 Detachment at Rio de Janeiro returned to Natal. 18 July 1943 Squadron administration moved from Natal to Belem. 3 October 1943. Detachment of three aircraft moved from Belem to Fortaleza, Brazil. 30 November 1943 Detachment of one aircraft moved from Belem to NAF Recife, Brazil. 19 December 1943. Detachment at Fortaleza returned to Belem. 20 December 1943. Detachment of four aircraft moved from Belem to Trinidad, British West Indies. 23 December 1943 Detachment at Trinidad moved to Zandery Field, Dutch Guiana. 24 December 1943. Detachment at Recife returned to Belem. 3 February 1944. Detachment of three aircraft moved from Belem to Fernando Noronha, Brazil. 3 February 1944. Detachment of two aircraft moved from Belem to Sao Luiz, Brazil. 8 March 1944. Detachment at Zandery Field returned to Belem. 14 March 1944. Detachment at Sao Luiz returned to Belem. 29 April 1944. Squadron administration moved from Belem to Maceio, Brazil. 15 May 1944. Squadron administration moved from Maceio to Ipitanga, Brazil. Three aircraft remained as a detachment. 15 May 1944. Detachment at Fernando Noronha returned to Ipitanga. 1 July 1944 Detachment of two planes moved from Ipitanga to Fernando Noronha. 6 July 1944. Detachment of one plane moved from Ipitanga to Caravellas, Brazil. 7 July 1944. Detachment at Fernando Noronha returned to Ipitanga. 10 July 1944. Detachment of three aircraft moved from Ipitanga to Santa Cruz, Brazil. 31 July 1944. Detachment at Caraavellas returned to Ipitanga. 5 August 1944. Detachment at Santa Cruz returned to Ipitanga. 10 August 1944. Detachment of five aircraft moved to Santa Cruz to initiate United States Brazilian Aviation Training Unit. 29 September 1944 Detachment at Maceio returned to Ipitanga.
Actions in Which Engaged: 14 May 1943. Enemy submarine attacked by bow gunner of plane flying from Natal, Brazil piloted by Lt.(jg) John C. Batchelder,Jr. USNR, 95616. 9 July 1943. Enemy submarine attacked by Lt.(jg) Frank Fisher Hare, USNR, 112540, flying from Belem, Brazil. 9 July 1943. Enemy submarine attacked by Lt.(jg) Stanley E. Auslander, USNR, 104673, flying from Belem, Brazil. 10 July 1943. Enemy submarine attacked by Lt.(jg) Saul S. Deutsch USNR, 106268, flying from Belem, Brazil.. 20 July 1943. Enemy submarine attacked by Lt.(jg) Stanley E Auslander, USNR, 106268, flying from Belem, Brazil. 21 July 1943, Enemy submarine attacked by Lt.(jg) Richard H. Rowland USNR, 112643, flying from Belem, Brazil. 23 July 1943, Enemy submarine attacked by Lt. Paul T. Weber, USN, flying from Belem, Brazil. 3 November 1943. Enemy submarine attacked by Lt. John H. Daugherty, USNR, 106622, flying from Fortaleza, Brazil.
Loss of Personnel Through Enemy Action: Lieutenant (junior grade) Frank Fisher Hare, USNR, 112540, Philadelphia, Penn. Killed 9 July 1943 by anti-aircraft fire from enemy submarine off Belem, Brazil.
Changes in Number of Aircraft: Twelve planes were assigned to VP-94 when commissioned. In July 1943 the number was increased to fifteen.
VPB-94 HISTORY NARRATIVE CONFIDENTIAL- DECLASSIFIED The entrance of aircrarft into the war on enemy submarines was directly responsible for the formation of Patrol Squadron Ninety Four. At 1500 GCT 3 March 1942, the squadron was formally placed in commisson as a unit of the Atlantic Fleet to serve under the Eastern Sea Frontier. Officers and men assembled on the seaplane ramp at the Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, to hear Lt. Lloyd H. McAlpine, USN, Acting commanding officer, read the commissioning papers. As outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations the duties of Patrol Squadron Ninety Four were three:-
1. Protection for United States and Allied shipping from enemy submarines. 2.Search for and destruction of enemy submarines. 3.Search for and destruction of enemy raiders and blockade runners.
At the time of commissioning, no planes had been assigned to the squadron, but a training program was started immediately with planes of VP-93. The commanding officer, Lt. Comdr. David W. Shafer, USN, was in Iceland and could not join his command until the latter part of April. By this time VP-94 was using its own PBY-5As which had been ferried from San Diego, California.18 May 1942 was the first in a long and still continuing series of "moving days." The squadron flew to the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, Rhode Island for a brief tour of duty. Quonset was a favorite with the Squadron for several reasons. It was the first operating headquarters of the unit. Here it was that the work of escorting convoys and searching for enemy submarines began in earnest.The newly commissioned ensigns were especially appreciative of the smart salutes and deferential attitude of the even more recently commissioned jaygees and lieutenants of the Quonset Point Indoctrination School Administrative headquarters were moved to Jacksonville, Florida 31 May 1942 with six planes remaining at Quonset Point as a detachment. It took five trailer trucks to move the squadron's gear...a safari which was under the command of Ensign Charles R. Earle, USNR, 106 395, and included eight enlisted men and a police guard. The Quonset Point detachment moved on to Jacksonville the 14th of June.Jacksonville provided a fine oprating base for VP-94, with excellent repair and maintenance facilities plus good living conditions and a highly appreciated liberty town.A detachment of three planes was sent to Charleston, South Carolina 10 June 1942, another of four planes to Cherry Point, North Carolina on the 1st of September. The Charleston detachment took up quarters in Quonset huts. Everyone felt a little closer to the war because of the lack of modern plumbing facilities. Cherry Point provided regular Naval Air Station facilities for repair and upkeep of the P-boats.This detachment performed the first rescue mission of the squadron 16 November 1942. A Civil Air Patrol plane had crashed in the sea off Wrightsville Beach. Lt. John B. Wayne, USN, Lt Charles W. Gorton, USNR, 136143, Lt.(jg) Jack (n) Carlson, USNR, 106471, and Ransford, Clyde E. CAP(AA), 311 15 90, USN, were dispatched to the scene. They landed their Catalina in heavy seas and threw a line to two Civil Air Patrol pilots who were afloat on the wreckage of their plane. The line missed. One of the crew members, Coughlin, Francis Michael, AMM2C, 256 37 12, USN, dove overboard and retrieved the pair, one of whom was dead when taken aboard the 94 airplane. They were Guy T. Cherry, Jr., 1st Lieutenant and George Groves, 2nd Lieutenant, both of the civilian air patrol. Other members of the VP-94 crew included Kenny, Patrick Roger, AMM3C, 638 00 42, USNR; Rippert, Joseph John, ACRM (AA), 341 99 71; Shangraw, Reynold Dakin, AMM3C, 201 91 70, USN, and Walker, Wendell Leroy, AMM2C, 328 69 45, USN. All officers and men received a commendation from the Squadron's commanding officer.A second rescue mission was accomplished during 94's stay in the States when one of its Catalinas was successful in dropping medical supplies to a destroyer at sea for an emergency appendectomy.Early in 1943, VP-93 received orders to move to Natal, Brazil. Accordingly, eleven aircraft, loaded with gear and personnel departed Jacksonville 16 January. Five days later the squadron had reached its destination, after making stops at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Georgetown, British Guiana and Belem, Brazil. At the time the squadron was attached to Comtaskforce 23. Submarines were making heavy inroads on shipping in the South Atlantic area and the first Trinidad-Bahia and Bahia-Trinidad convoys were being formed. Almost immediately, 94 planes started escorting these convoys and making sweeps for enemy underseas craft.Living conditions at Natal were primitive at the best. The housing problem was solved with tents, but the problem of dry floors never was satisfactorily solved, in spite of dams and ditches and trenches dug at all hours of day and night. After a few experiences no one left their shoes on the deck at night for fear they'd be washed away to sea by morning. The food consisting of a steady diet of sausage, Spam and salmon left a lot to be deisired. Even laundry was a problem that had to be solved by a "Laundry Officer." Lt.(jg) John H. Daugherty, USNR, 106 622, was made impresario of the washboard and was obliged to ferret out soap in large quantities, tubs, charcoal, irons, ironing boards, starch and "laundry queens" The latter were relatively easy to procure...except for one who could read to do the marking and see that everyone got at least the same amount of clean clothes returned as the amount of dirty ones turned in.VP-94, as well as other Navy aircraft squadrons, moved into Brazil in order to conduct anti-submaring warfare operations. VP-83 arrived in April-June 1942 and operated up and down the coast, covering the convoys as the submarine situation warranted. At that time, VP-83 used existing Panair facilities and the Army facilities under construction. The planes flew up and down the coast using Panair fields and borrowing spare parts from both Panair and the Army. The personnel lived in local hotels on a per diem basis in order to support this work.When VP-94 arrived in South America, it operated in a similar manner.The squadron covered the coastal waters of Brazil from Amapa to Bahia, a distance of 1800 miles. There was little time for training as almost every hop was an operational mission. In many cases, a 94 plane followed a convoy down the coast, landing on primitive airstrips for refueling, eating and sleeping in the planes when hotels were crowded or unavailable.Some VP-94 planes were away from Natal as long as two weeks at a time, making the Amapa-Bahia run and returning with a northbound convoy. When VP-83 returned to the States for new planes in May of 1943, the squadron had the Brazilian coast practically to itself. VP-74 arrived in Natal in December 1942 and built the seaplane base. This squadron also expedited the construction of the seaplane base at Aratu, near Bahia. But maintenance difficulties prevented the Mariners from taking as active a part in operations in the area as other squadrons.These were the days when Natal was regarded as a possible German stepping-stone to the new world. The U.S.Army was represented in some force at Natal and Belem. In April 1943 the Navy added to its forces in the area with the establishment of Fleet Air Wing SIXTEEN at Natal. In order to provide closer contact with the Fourth Fleet, the Wing moved to Recife in July 1943. In October of that year, the first Naval Air Facility in Brazil was established at Ibura Field, Recife and others soon followed. In December 1943 the submarine estimate dropped to zero for coastal operations and the Wing started operations in the central South Atlantic to intercept blockade runners and cargo submarines. Brazilian bases were constructed by ADP, a construction company controlled by Panam, in order to keep as many U.S. Military personnel out of Brazil before that country entered the war. After Brazil's entry into the war, U.S.E.D. took over construction work and later on, Naval public works organization constructed some bases. When VP-94's first detachment went to Belem in June 1943, Army facilities were used. When army space was not available, personnel of the squadron lived in the Grande Hotel. Spare parts were borrowed from the Army and from Panair. When the entire squadron and the Hedron detachment was moved to Belem in July 1943, the personnel were subsisted in the Army transient quarters and maintenance was conducted from tents on the field. In September the Navy housing facilities and storehouses were completed and the squadron and Hedron moved into their own base. In December the Naval Air Facility was established, taking over the functions of base and maintainence moved out of tents. The history of the bases in Brazil has been primarily been one of moving in fast and operating, buildng the bases and finally developing a base organization, so it was necessary that all available facilities and material be utilized, whether Army, Panair or Naval. (1)
In June 1943, a detachment of five aircraft was sent to Belem, a base destined to be the most active for VP-94 as far as anti-submarine operation was concerned. About this time renewed activity of enemy submarines and the inability of the newer Ventura squadrons to operate from bases at great distances from the convoy lanes required the further splitting of 94 into detachments. When the convoy system was extended southward from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, four planes were ordered to Santos Dumont airport for operations. Catalinas were kept busy flying coverage and anti-submarine sweeps around the clock. Another detachment was sent to Amapa, a small settlement in northern Brazil. The air strip there was very short and every landing and take-off, especially at night was an event to be remembered. The first direct contact with the enemy by VP-94 occured shortly after dawn on 14 May 1943. Lt. (jg) John C. Batchelder, Jr.,USNR, 95616, had departed from Parnamirim Field, Natal to provide coverage for TB-13. The plane had just passed through a rain squall when the bow gunner sighted a submarine dead ahead, three quarters a mile distant, at a position 04-25 South, 35-10 West. The plane was so close that the nose interfered with the pilot's view for a moment. He nosed the plane into a steep dive with power off, and as the submarine submerged, started his stop watch. Just before the submarine submerged the tail broke out of the water at a sharp angle. The plane was still at an altitude of 500 feet when over the spot of submergence. No drop of depth bombs was made, as such a drop would have to have been made from a sharp turn or skid at a comparatively high altitude.However the bow gunner opened up immediately after sighting the U-boat. His bullets were seen to strike in and around the conning tower. (2)
The squadron commander held meritorious mast 15 May 1943 and commended the bow gunner, Lombardo, Joseph (n), AMM3c, 316 78 75, for his display of "notable alertness and presence of mind in the performance of his duty while engaged in action against the enemy."(3)
July 1943 proved to be the red letter month for VP-94.
The night of July 7-8, convoy TJ-1 was attacked in the Trinidad area, two ships being sunk and others damaged. Planes were immediately despatched from Belem to operate out of Amapa, taking over coverage of the convoys. On the morning of 9 July several sightings were made at a distance, both by planes and surface craft, indicating that the attack was being continued. BT-18 was entering the area from the South at this time and is was necessary for five planes in Belem and a limited number of pilots to give night and day coverage and fly daylight sweeps. Lt. (jg) Stanley Ernest Auslander, USNR, 104 673, Lt(jg) John Milton Elliot, USNR, 113 067, Lt.(jg) Frank Joseph McMackin Jr., USNR, 112 627, in 94-P-1, enroute to relieve on convoy coverage, sighted the swirl of a submerging submarine just before noon and advised the base that gambit tactics would be employed. At approximately 1230 Peter, 94-P-10 sweeping the area immediately east of TJ-1 sighted a surfaced submarine about 60 miles distant from the swirl sighting. Just after starting the first leg of the sweep at 1235 Peter, the co-pilot sighted the U-boat 12 miles distant at 03-54 North, 49-52 West. The submarine apparently did not see the plane until quite late for no attempt to submerge was made. At a distance of more than a mile from the submarine, orange flecks from the submarine's anti-aircraft fire were noticed, and almost immediately thereafter an explosive shrapnel shell enterd the bow on the port side exploding against the instrument panel, setting fire to the Sperry oil, and causing billowing smoke and flame. The pilot, Lt. (jg) Frank Fisher Hare, USNR, 112 640 was struck by shrapnel in the head, heart, and body. The run was continued and the two starboard depth bombs released. Interrogation of those of the crew who could see the drop of bombs indicated that they landed close together, approximately 25 to 35 feet from the stern of the submarine and about 45 degrees to starboard. There was no visible indication of damage. The bow gunner fired his .30 calibre guns continuously during the approach and the port blister ;.50 calibre gun was brought to bear after the drop. About 20 to 30 minutes after the original attack, the plane departed, the submarine being still surfaced. The evaluation of the attack was "no damage." 94-P-1 and 107-B-5 investigated the area about 1300 Peter, but found no traces of the submarine.
The complement of the aircraft included: Pilot Lt. (jg) Frank Fisher Hare, USNR, 112 640 Co-Pilot Lt (jg) Jean Price Phelps, USNR, 112 158 Navigator Lt.(jg) Michael Carl Argento, USNR, 112 141 Tower Lombardo, Joseph (n), AMM3c, 316 78 75, USN Bow Eisaman, Clifford Emery, AMM3c, 652 10 02, USNR Starboard
Blister Testen, Andrew Frank, AOM3c, 613 99 69, USNR Port
Blister Brown, Thomas Russell, ARM3c, 268 81 22, USN Radio Lack, James Thomas, ARM3c, 356 66 90, USN
(4)
Lt(jg) Hare was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Purple Heart. Meanwhile, 94-P-1 continued its gambit and at 1424 Peter, a surfacing submarine was sighted about three miles dead ahead, position 03-22 North, 48-38 West. The plane was flying at 3700 feet over a broken cloud base of .4 to .6 cumulus at 1700 feet and had just passed through a fairly heavy cloud. The U-Boat was aabout 2 1/2 miles distant. As the pilots could not see the submarine, the nose was pushed over to bring it into view. Water was running from its decks and within a few seconds it was fully surfaced, cruising at about 15 knots on 125 degrees true. The pilot held the plane in a dive directly toward the submarine, without changing course and threw on the bombing switch. Lt. (jg) McMackin blew the warning horn and rushed to the waist compartment to take pictures of the enemy underseas craft through the port blister. The throttles were cut, but still the plane attained a speed of 200 knots indicated. At an altitude of about 150 feet, Lt.(jg) Elliot released the depth bombs by intervalometer spaced at 73 feet. The submarine was fully surfaced, proceeding on course, and there was no evidence that the crew, three or four of whon could be seen in the conning tower, were aware of the approach of the plane. An easy turn to port was made after the plane was pulled out of its dive and while the spray was still visible. When the water subsided no trace of the submarine would be seen. All of the occupants of the waist hatch were thrown into the bilges by the pull-up. The gunner had been firing the .50 calibre and had sprayed the conning tower with 7 to 10 rounds. As he fell, the gun was apparently elevated, so that one or two bullets went through the starboard wing of the plane. No serious damage was done. While circling, a greenish-brown slick was visible and in the center of it, two swimming men, a large timber, several small articles and two boxes. A crew member then reported seeing three additional men in the water and Lt.(jg) Elliot spotted them on the next approach. Five were counted at this time, but three apparently sank very quickly. A life raft was dropped, but drifted away before the swimmers could reach it Four life jackets were dropped, two inflated and two uninflated and the survivors appeared to get into the inflated ones. Emergency rations were also dropped within reach. Four minutes after the drop a large amount of oil started to rise two or three hundred yards from the slick along the sub's track and observation showed the slick continuing to grow in length and breadth to a size of half to a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide. There was no forward motion to the oil slick. The attack was assessed as "probably sunk." 94-P-1 was manned as follows:
Pilot Lt.(jg) Stanley Ernest Auslander, USNR, 104 673 Co-Pilot Lt.(jg) John Milton Elliot, USNR, 113 067 Navigator Lt.(jg) Frank Joseph McMackin, Jr.,USNR, 112 627 Port Blister Denauw, Frank Joseph, AMM2c, 606 19 58, USNR Starboard Blister Watson, John Harry, ARM2c, 406 77 87, USN Radio Garren, Hoyt Edwin, ARM2c, 296 00 73, USN Bow Smith, Elmer Bryant, AMM3c, 268 81 81, USN Tower Mustone, Joseph James, Jr., AOM3c, 607 52 10, USNR
(5)
As a result of the action, Distinguished Flying crosses were awarded to Lt.(jg) Auslander and Lt.(jg) Elliott, Air medals to Lt.(jg) McMackin, Denauw, Watson, Garren, Smith, and Mustone.
The following day, 10 July 1943, VP-94 made another attack on an enemy submarine. 94-P-1 took off from Belem at 1940 Peter on convoy coverage mission. The convoy was located at 2200 Peter. Fifteen minutes later, with the plane at 1500 feet, a radar contact was obtained. The radar was switched to homing and course was changed toward the target. After one and a half minutes the plane was swung to the port in order to get around the target, the pilot made a sharp turn to starboard, starting his run from 1500 feet, distant 5 miles. At 800 feet, three miles distant, a flare was dropped, both for illumination and to give the target, the identity of which was still in doubt, a chance to identify itself. The light was insufficient to reveal anything and the plane was then too low to release another flare. Guns had been broken out, but the crew was directed to hold its fire because of the improbabilty of getting any hits and the possibility of revealing the plane's position. The target was passed about one third to one half a mile to port, where a very large wake came into view, the second plot could see the vessel and itentified it almost certainly as a submarine. A 180 degree turn to port was made at about 150 feet altitude with the wake continuosly in sight and an attack was carried out using the vortex of the wake as the aiming point. The plane was nosed over slightly just prior to release. Immediately afterward, the pilot looked down and saw a large, dark object in the forward part of the wake. The three members of the crew who had an opportunity to look at the wake, all of whom had been in 94-P-1 on 9 July 1943, felt that from the size of the wake it must have been a submarine. All could see it at about half a mile on the first run. No superstructure could be picked out in the dim moonlight, but Lt.(jg) G.W.Cluff, who possibly had the best view, believed he discerned the outlines of a submarine Denauw, F.J., AMM2c, the only member of the crew who saw the explosions believes that the starboard bombs, the last to drop, exploded about 25 yards ahead of the submarine on the port side. Immediately after the drop the pilot returned to the convoy, informed the escort commander of the action and gave bearings and distance. A contact report was sent to base. The plane returned to the attack area in ten minutes but failed to make any contact, so returned to the convoy and continued escort. At 0310 Peter 11 July, four hours and thirty five minutes after the attack, while making a radar sweep around the convoy, a wake was sighted directly below the plane at 03-02 North, 44-10 West. The plane was at 1500 feet, fifteen miles ahead of the convoy and thirty five miles from the position of the attack. The sighting was made by Lt (jg) V.L. Pendergraft who was in the pilot's seat. Lt. S.S. Deutsch returned to the pilot's seat and dropped another flare. His bombs had been expended so he hoped to force the submarine, if such it was, to submerge. Nothing was visible. Aboard the 94-P-1 were:
Pilot Lt.(jg) Saul S Deutsch, USNr, 106 268 Co-Pilot Lt.(jg) Gorden E. Harbett, USNR, 117 045 Navigator Lt.(jg) Goldwin E. Cluff, USNR, 116 297 2nd Pilot Lt.(jg) Vernon L. Pendergraft, USNR, 243 189 Tower Denauw, Frank J., AMM2c, 381 19 58 Starboard Blister Lester, William R., AOM2c, 381 31 13 Port Blister Garren, Hoyt E., ARM2c, 296 00 73 Waist hatch Smith, Elmer B., AMM3c 268 81 81, USN Radio-Radar Watson, John H., ARM2c, 406 77 87, USN
(6)
On 20 July 1943, 94-P-14 took off at 1030 Peter from Amapa, Brazil to relieve (4-P-8 covering convoy TJ-2. The plane made a sweep ahead of the convoy. On the return leg, at 1341 Peter, the bow lookout reported a ship to port, ten o'clock, five miles. The position was 03-33 North, 48-45 West. The plot, Lt.(jg) S.E. Auslander recognized it as an enemy submarine on course about 114 true. His altitude at the time was 4000 feet. He blew the warning horn and signalled the tower to put the mixture control into auto-rich. The plane was nosed over and a turn to port started. Meanwhile, the co-pilot turned the bombing switch on and picked up the "pickle.". As the run was started, the air was filled with bursts of smoke and tracers. During the run, the navigator ran back to the blister for the camera and the radioman started to send out the contact report. The throttles were pulled back and the plane lost altitude and picked up speed as the pilot executed several skidding turns in order to evade the gunfire. About a mile away from the sub, the pilot levelled off briefly and then pushed over again on course 240 true. The co-pilot, on signal from the first pilot made the drop at about 100 feet and 165 knots indicated. The pilot held his course briefly after pulling out, and then made a sharp turn to port. According to the navigator, who was in the starboard blister, the drop was over. The bombs landing 30 ot 50 feet over the submarine on the starboard side and slightly ahead. The crew continued firing on the sub from blister guns and the bow gun. On scene of action voice frequency, the pilot called the escort vessels of the convoy which were close by, and at the same time the radioman was instructed to send MO's on 414 KCS. The escort commander finally answered and was advised of the attack and position, and that the plane was sending MO's on frequency. Meanwhile the plane was still firing on the submarine, circling to port to give the port gun a chance to fire and then to starboard. The submarine continued to circle and return fire. After about 40 minutes, he started on an erratic zig-zig course. At this time the plane had reached an altitude of 5000 feet, visibility was unlimited and there were no clouds. The pilot felt that the escort would be able to see the plane at that altitude. A large wake, heading for the plane's position was observed, so course was changed toward the escort. He was approximately 20 miles away and making good speed. When the plane was half way between the sub and the escort vessel, the after-station reported the submarine starting to submerge. The pilot immediately turned and dove on it with a green flourescent dye marker ready to mark the spot. The U-boat seemed to have difficulty submerging, as it seemed to go under, come up, go under and come up again. It finally submreged at 1445 Peter and the marker was dropped. The plane, circling the spot, notified the escort vessels that the sub had submerged. The escort apparently discontinued his course towards the plane. The pilot started to fly a 20 mile square around the point at which the sub submerged and completed the circuit once. At 1610 Peter the plane was relieved by 94 P-12, and after indicatiing the spot where the dye marker was still clearly visible, the plane departed for Belem. Although the crew thought the bombs fell over, pictures of the attack indicated a perfect straddle. The Plane expended all its ammunition strafing the submarine after the drop. In an hours time, the plane received but one hit by an explosive shrapnel shell even though it was within close gun range most of the time. The evaluation of this attack was "no damage." :
94-P-14 was manned by: Pilot Lt.(jg) Stanley E. Auslander, USNR, 104 673 Co-pilot Lt.(jg) Kenneth P. Rauer, USNR, 106 640 Navigator and Waist Hatch Lt.(jg) James K. Buckwalter, USNR, 113 065 Tower Lord, Elmer B., AMM2c, 201 72 28, USN Bow Koszewski, Joseph A., S2c, 614 99 37, USNR Port Waist Delorenzo, George J., AMM2c, 402 94 78 Starboard Waist Walker, Wendell L., AMM2c, 328 69 45, USN Radio Spence, James G., ARM2c, 342 45 35, USN
(7)
The following day, 21 July 1943, 94-P-4 took off from Belem at 0230 Peter to relieve 94-P-7 on coverage of TJ-2. The plane arrived in the area and started a search for the convoy at about 0530 Peter. At 0602 Peter a submarine was sighted at 03-56 North, 48-46 West by the bow watch, distant two to three miles. It was , making six to seven knots and its deck appeared to be slightly awash with little wake showing. The plane was at 1200 feet, indicated air speed 95 knots. The pilot, Lt.(jg) R.H. Roland rolled the plane slightly to bring the sub into view. The pilot's bombing switch was then closed and the warning horn blown. Second pilot, Lt.(jg) A.C. Anselmo manned the camera at the tunnel hatch and later at the port blister. In the second pilot's seat was Lt.(jg) Jones. The bow watch went into action to prepare the .30 calibre gun, but he was unsuccessful in freeing the barrel group to allow the breech lock to disengage. The bow gun was not cleared throughout the run. The pilot immediately turned to attack, but seeing the trouble with bow gun and encountering heavy anti-aircraft fire, veered slightly to port for about five seconds then started a shallow diving run. Gunfire from the submarine was persistent. The rudder fin was hit at the base during the final turn. A shrapnel shot was received at the chine of the hull at the radioman's station when the plane was approximately one mile from the submarine. The path of this shot could be followed by tracer and the ensuing explosion heard upon contact. Radioman Watson suffered lower leg and ankle injuries from this shot, but managed to pull himself to the blister and ask Garren to reLieve him. The run itself was routine, in that the pilot successfully tried to approximate the condition with which he had become familiar in practice bombing hops. Fire from the sub ceased just before the drop. At the time of the drop, from an altitude of 75 feet, indicated air speed of 140-150 knots, Lt.(jg) Jones was able to view the conning tower close by to starboard. Lt.(jg) Rowland pressed the pickle, but the inboard starboard bomb hung up. From reports of the crew it seemed that charges number one and number two landed so close that they exploded almost under the port side just aft of the conning tower. During a shallow pull-out and turn to port, the bow of the submarine was seen by the pilot to be emerging from geysers of water at a very sharp angle. The port gunner and the tower watch could both see the port bombs enter the water and viewed the start of the explosions. The starboard bomb was observed to drop to starboard of and ahead of the bow of the submarine at distance judged to be about 30 feet. The port gun was brought to bear and a full can was fired in long bursts. The pilot continued the turn for approximately one minute in order to remain in the immediate vicinity. Lt.(jg) Anselmo observed the sinking of the sub while the plane was in this turn at nearly 90 degrees to release course. Upon re-establishing sight contact with the spot, the pilot saw no submarine, but in its place an oval oil patch which increased in size to 200 yards in length and 150-175 yards in width. Some brown streaks running throught the oil-darkened area were observed by the crew. Communication difficulties were encountered because of the shrapnel hit. Photographic runs were made from all positions throughout the plane On the second passage over the area four survivors were sighted. Rubber life rafts were dropped and the survivors boarded them. The squadron commander believed the attack was made possible by the attack the previous day by 94-P14. It was probable, in his estimation, that the submarine was the same in both cases. This attack was assessed as "known sunk."
94-P-4 was manned by Pilot Lt. (jg) Richard Rowland, USNR, 112 643 Co-pilot Lt. (jg) William H. Jones, USN Navigator (2nd Pilot) Lt. (jg) Albert G. Anselmo, USNR, 121 505 Bow Denauw, Frank J. , AMM2c, 606 19 58, USNR Port Waist Smith, Elmer B., AMM3c, 268 81 81 , USN Tower Wood, Ernest W. Jr., AMM3c, 269 10 18, USN Starboard Waist Garren, Hoyt E ., ARM2c 296 00 73, USN Radio Watson, John H., ARM2c 406 77 87, USN
(8)
Lt.(jg) Rowland and Lt.(jg) Jones received the Distinguished Flying Cross. Air Medals were awarded to Lt.(jg) Anselmo and Wood, E.W. Jr., and a gold star in place of a second air medal to Denauw, Smith and Garren, and Watson. On 23 July 1943, 94-P-5 departed Belem at 0610 on an anti-submarine sweep. The flight had been at a constant altitude of 2000 feet throughout the morning, passing through the the bottom of the clouds. At 1050 the plane was passing through a moderate rain squall. At 1102 it was in the clear, there being a high overcast at 18,000 feet. Visibility was 10 to 15 miles due to haze, except to starboard, shere, at five miles there was a heavy rain squall. At 1106 the bow lookout reported a submarine on the starboard beam. The position was 07-10 North, 51-36 West. The pilot started to turn in that direction and immediately saw a submarine still surfacing. Preparations were made to attack and the plane was nosed over. While still three and one half to four miles away, the submarine commenced firing. Lt. Paul Weber, USN, the pilot, started a slight evasive maneuver while in the dive. At one mile from the sub the bow gunner fired 30 rounds, then the gun jammed due to a defective shell. The sub on surfacing was on course approximately 060 degrees true at about 4 knots and increasing speed. It was making a turn to starboard in an effort to reach the rain squall which was a quarter of a mile away. The pickle was pressed at about 200 feet from the sub at an altitude of 100 feet and with an indicated air speed of 195 knots. Lt.(jg) J.T.Cline noticed two or three men leaving the deck gun and running to the conning tower. The starboard gunner started firing as the plane passed over the submarine. His gun jammed however after five rounds. He saw the port bombs enter the water approximately 20 feet on the port side of the U-boat just forward of the conning tower. The two starboard bombs fell in front of the sub approximately 20 to 25 feet which fact was verified by the man in the tower. Both men saw the submarine's bow raise out of the water approximately 20 to 30 degrees from the explostions and roll over the starboard side and sink. From full surfaced poslition at the time of the explosions the sub disappeared in 7 to 8 seconds. The port blister gun fired about eight rounds. Lt.(jg) J.D. Engels, Sorrell, J.C. and Simons, J.D. saw a large black oil slick 15 to 20 yards wide. The plane passed into a rain squall within 15 seconds of the attack. After getting the plane under control the pilot turned to starboard and came out of the rain squall about 3 to 4 miles south of the attack, then started back to the area which was being rapidly covered by rain. Just before the rain closed over the area, a large black patch of oil could be seen, but by the time the plane returned, it was closed over with heavy rain. Smoke bombs were dropped and the plane departed to the clear. Another smoke bomb was dropped out side the rain area and when the rain came down to it, another was dropped. The plane was pushed westward gradually by the wind and the rain. MO's were sent for other planes. Peter 5 was reliveved at 1215 Peter by 94-P-15. The assessment of this attack was "probably slightly damaged." (9)
The Commander Fourth Fleet in forwarding the report of anti-submarine action by aircraft No. 6 to the Commander in Chief United States Fleet said, "This command notes with pleasure the unremitting activity of VP-94 during July 1943. Squadron planes flew 1126 hours leading to six attacks and three probable sinkings of enemy submarines during the month."
Aboard the plane at the time of the attack were: Pilot Lt. Paul T. Weber, USN Co-pilot Lt.(jg) John T. Cline, USNR, 114 446 Co-pilot Navigator Lt. (jg) Joseph D. Engels, USNR, 114 335 Bow Simons, James E., AMM2c, 296 01 18 Radio Santora, Joseph D., ARM2c, 224 33 47, USN Tower Simons, Joseph D., AMM2c, 296 01 19 USN Port Blister Owens, Chris C., ARM2c 272 66 17, USN Starboard Blister Sorrell, Johm C., AMM3c, 262 90 83, USN
What proved to be the last enemy submarine attacked by VP-94 was one located off Fortaleza, Brazil.
94-P-6 departed from base 3 November 1943 at 1300 Peter to provide coverage for convoy TJ-12. While coming up the track of the convoy, the plane was at 3000 feet making use of cloud cover. At approximately 1345 Peter at 03-33 South, 37-42 West, the bow watch sighted a submarine's wake 45 degrees off the starboard bow at a distance of ten miles. The wake was described by the pilot as fairly broad and about 100 yards long. The lookout could see waves breaking as far back as the submarine's conning tower, indicating the sub was running with decks awash. The plane was turned to starboard and kept in the clouds. The sun was kept behind the aircraft as a gradual let-down was made. The approach was from the submarine's port at an angle of 35 degrees relative to his course. After dropping from 150 feet, a sharp evasive turn to the port was made, Just as the drop was made, or very shortly before, the sub started to submerge, turning hard to port. Just before they passed over the enemy craft, the pilot and the co-pilot saw three separate, distinct puffs of white smoke issuing from the conning tower. The submarine was completely submerged 30 to 45 seconds after the drop. The number two and number three depth bombs failed to detonate and resulted in marring a perfect attack. The number two charge was dropped abeam the conning tower on the submarine's port. The number three depth charge entered the water just at the bow on the starboard side. Number one had exploded approximately 110 feet to the submarine's port. Number two detonated at a point approximatley 100 feet to starboard forward of the conning tower. The pilot returned to the scene to drop one green marker and one bronze slick. The green markers contained in number one and number four depth bombs were also visible. The area was circled until the plane was relieved and returned to base. the evaluation of the attack was "no damage." Aboard 94-P-6 during the attack were: PilotLt. John H. Daugherty, USNR, 106 622 Co-pilot Lt.(jg) Goldwin W. Cluff, USNR, 116 297 Navigator (3rd Pilot)Ens. Rayford W. Addington, USNR, 277 807 Bow Gattman, George B.,AMM2c, 406 21 978 Tower Gaudet, Leon T. , AMM2c, 274 66 91, USN Starboard Blister Schwartz, George M., AMM2c, 612 44 01 USNR Port Blister Wright, Kenneth D., ARM2c, 670 12 91, USN Radio Nutty, Joe J. Jr., ARM3c, 670 12 91, USNR Aft, near blister Richardson, "R". "C". , PR2c, 274 31 06, USNR (10)
By this time, the number of U-boats in the South Atlantic area had become smaller and smaller. VP-94 Planes continued to fly tens of thousands of miles on anti-submarine sweeps based on D/Fs, estimates and reported sightings by other planes and surface craft. The November attack proved to be the final one for the squadron in the Solant region. With a detachment of ?? aircraft already operating from Belem, squadron administration was moved to that base from Natal in mid July 1943. Detachments were maintained at Fortaleza for a time, at Zandery Field, Dutch Guiana and at Fernando Noronha. Fortaleza was much appreciated for the good living conditions obtainable and the recreation facilities...among which were listed horseback riding and swimming and sunning on an attractive. beach. Zandery was a different story...situated at the edge of the jungle...and hampered by an equatorial, steamy climate. Practically all flying was night flying, performed in poor weather. Prices were high, recreation was almost unknown but the detachment was regarded as good duty because of the 33% increase in pay for duty on Dutch territory. Even the extra pay seemed small recompense for do conditions faced. Fernando Noronha, a small island 150 miles notrtheast of Brazil's bulge, became a base for anti-submarine operations in mid 1943. It became known as "The Rock" probably because part of it was reserved as a penal colony for Brazilian convicts. The Rock proved to be a mass of red and sticky mud with incidence of rainfall that could only be described as colossal. The Plane Captains refused to allow any one to enter one of the 94 Cats without first removing his shoes. But Fernando had a lot on the credit side as well, including such activites as fishing for tuna and barracuda...volley ball, basketball, and baseball, mountain climbing, hiking, and excellent surf swimming. It also served as a training ground for the squadrons newest navigators. Anti-submarine sweeps were often plotted out into the sea to PLE. Fernando HAD to be there when you came in... with somewhere around a hundred gallons of gas left in the tanks. Throughout its career in South America, the personnel and planes of VP-94 have been on duty in almost every coastal community. When the list includes the bases at which 94 officers have served under detached duty orders, a complete Baedeker of Brazil is compiled as witness a squadron letterhead suggested by Lt. Comdr Swenson, but never used because of its necessarily high classification.
Casa Do VP-94 Branch Offices in all Principal Cities Service Where and When You Want It
We move anything...Bombs, bullets, fresh meat (good and bad), USO shows (good and bad), admirals' bands, Brazilian laborers. carrier pilots (who need flight time), dogs monkeys, beer, booze, gems, appendicitis cases, malarial patients, people with fractured skulls, PV survivors, jewel merchants, disbursing officers (good and bad), Admirals, Captains, Commanders, Lieutenants, Ensigns, and other high ranking officials.
English spoken! Quonset Point Natal Clevelandia Norfolk Fernando Noronha Teofilia Otoni Charleston Ascension Waller Savannah Port Lyaeuty Edinburgh Jacksonville Recife Xeres Georgetown Maceio Borinquen Zandery Bahia Santo Dumont Cayenne Caravellas Santa Cruz San Diego Victoria Galeao Seattle Rio De Janeiro Parnamarin Widby Island Dakar Patos Kodiak Trinidad Monrovia Atlanta San Juan Atar Fort Worth Morrison Agadir Elizabeth City Miami 36th Street Camocin Florianopolis Rochambeau Aratu San Paulo Opa Locka Macapa Barrierras Lafayette Ilheos Feira Santana Atkinson Aracaju Manaos Raleigh Daytona Igarape Assu Floyd Bennett Winterhaven Fazenda Jurapatuba St. Thomas Amapa Barbados Adjacento Belem St.Lucia Val De Caes Sao Luiz Havana Cherry Point Fortaleza Guantanamo Newbern
On 10 April 1944, The squadron reached an all time high in detached duty at one time. Four Planes were on Fernando Noronha, two were operating under Comblimpron 41 at Sao Luiz, three crews were in Norfolk, Virginia to ferry new planes to Brazil, one plane was supplementing the Fleet Air Wing Sixteen cargo service from Recife, one pilot was assisting the Wing Utility squadron in PBY qualifications, one pilot was enroute to Africa as navigator for a Free French PBY, one officer was attending the Asdevlant ground school at Quonset Point, Rhode Island, one officer was in Rio on leave and the administrative command (what was left of it) was at Belem. Such squadron diversification led to the 94 slogan and shingle which hangs outside the Commanding Officer's office - "Casa do VP-94 - Branch Ofices in all principal cities." In April 1, 1944 squadron administration was transferred to Maceio for a short while. Maceio offered the most undesirable flying conditions of any the squadron had to face with the exception of Zandery. But in other respects it proved to be a desirable base. Civilization had come to such out of the way places by this time...and the barracks, the food and the recreation facilities were above average. The out door theatre was very popular, even when it rained. Ipitanga, the air station located near Bahia, Brazil was the final stop for the administarative command of the squadron while it was based in South Amerca. It has been popular with everyone attached to the squadron for a number of reasons. The The climate has been excellent and flying conditions just as good. The barracks accomodations have been comfortable but slightly overcrowded and the food has always been plentiful. Recreation has been centered almost entirely in athletics such as volleyball, basketball, softball, baseball, tennis, handball, and swimming. When a detachment was ordered to Santa Cruz, frequent ferry trips were necessary. The resulting liberties in Rio made Ipitanga more popular than ever. In July of this year, a detachment was ordered to Santa Cruz to participated in a submarine hunt with detachments of two PBM squadrons (VP-203 and VP-211). This proved to be the last submarine activity the squadron has been engaged in as the area has been free of enemy U-boats since that time. A non-operational detachment at Santa Cruz was established in August of 1944 as the USBATU (United States Brazilian Aviation Training Unit) under Lt. Comdr. Richard J. Craig, USN. Five Aircraft of the squadron were assigned to this work. The Squadron had had previous experience working with Brazilian pilots and crewmen while still stationed at Belem in April 1944. Part of a Brazilian squadron of PBY-5s was located at Belem at the time. VP-94 instituted a program of training, consisting of practical classes for radiomen and anti-submarine bombing practice for pilots. (11)
Under the direction of Lt. Comdr. H.R. Swenson, USNR 77963, a comprehensive training syllabus was drawn up for the Santa Cruz training program and submitted to Fleet Air Wing Sixteen, which had initiated the USBATU. (12)
The program was designed to provide a month's training in the PBY-5As for three separate classes of Brazilian pilots and aircrewmen and suitable maintainence training under the direction of Hedron 16. Upon completion of the first groups training September 15, it was sent to Ipitanga to undergo two months of operational training with the main body of the squadron. The second USBATU class, completed October 15, was moved to Belem, there to undergo operational training for a one month period with VPB-45. The third USBATU class, completed November 15, was given its operational training by the preceeding classes when the entire group was assigned to Galeao, the seaplane base at Rio de Janeiro 15 November. Six aircraft of VPB-94 were assigned to the Brazilian unit at that time, to form the nucleus of the proposed 15 plane Brazilian squadron. Lt. Comdr. Craig remained in operational control until 15 December, when the total of 15 aircraft were formally assigned to the Brazilians.
Six weeks of intensive groundwork was engaged in by the VP-94 officers who were to be assigned to USBATU. Each pilot was placed in a squadron department and assigned lectures to be given to the Brazilians on such topics as navigation, gunnery radio and radar, anti-submarine warfare, et c. Lecture notes were mimeographed in Portuguese and the services of an interpreter were made available to aid the few Brazilians who did not understand English. Flight hours wer e spent in bounce drills, navigation problems, radio procedure including use of the range and direction finding equipment, and general familiarization with the performance characteristics of the PBY-5A. By this time the first class reported to Ipitanga and the second class to Belem, the Brazilians were thoroughly familiar with the basic syllabus set up by the squadron. At Ipitanga, they commenced two months of intensive operational training, which included all kinds of day and night flying, single engine operation, anti-submarine bombing, escort of convoys and anti-submarine sweeps. The crewmen were assigned to specific planes, to work with the regular American crews. Pilots were given a series of lectures on anti-submarine, recognition of ships and planes and technical aspects of the PBY5A and its equipment. Toward the completion of the training at Ipitanga, Brazilian crews and pilots were flying all of the squadron's operational missions, with a Navy PPC as passenger and observer. A constant endeavor was made by the squadron to make the Brazilian personnel feel that it was part of the organization. A Brazilian aspirante acted as Assistant Squadron Duty Officer each day and saw to it that the flight schedule and other pertinent information reached all Brazilian pilots and crew members. Flight, Engineering, Gunnery, Personnel, Operations, Navigation, Communications, Radio-Radar, and Training. At the same time, Brazilian ground officers and maintainence men were receiving similiar training from the Ipitanga Hedron 16 detachment. Evidence of the success of the program came in November, when the squadron commanding officer was awarded the Commendation Ribbon by Vice Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, Commander Fourth Fleet. Pilot training in VP94 has been continous since the squadron's inception. Depending upon operational hours to be flown, the amount of it has varied considerably from month to month and from one location to another. In its first days at Norfolk, the majority of hours in the air were spent in checking out Patrol Plane Commanders, 1st and 2nd pilots. The goal aimed for was complete familiarization with the PBY5A. Thus operational training was held to a minimum. The detachment at Cherry Point found itself with so many operational flights to make that training had to be incorporated in each operational mission, whether escort of convoy or anti-submarine sweep. Anti-submarine warfare involving aircraft was far from a science in 1942 and 1943. Depth bombs hydrostatic fused were set at 75 and 125 feet. Very little was known about the submarine, and consequently the best way to attack it. A start was being made by December 1942 however, for in that month a VP-94 PBY5A was ordered by Comfairwinglant to Dahlgren Virginia for tests of anti-submarine equipment. While the squadron was still at Quonset Point, MAD gear was installed three aircraft and a series of tests made with it . By the time the squadron left the States for South America, however, this equipment had been removed. The Squadron was one of the first to experiment with search lights. They were installed on three aircraft in August of 1942 and used experimentally for a short while. But the generators could not handle the extra load demand by the powerful lights and the installations were removed before the organization left the States. The importance of practice bombing was realized early in the squadron's history. The difficulty of using minature bombs led to the development of a miniature bomb rack by an electrician attached to the organization, Alkire, Robert E., EM1c, USN. This rack enabled the pilot to drop one miniature bomb at a time from the tunnel hatch. The rack was accepted by the Bureau of Ordnance following Alkire's detailed report of the device to the Burea of Aeronautics and was in common use until the more adaptable wing rack was developed. Alkire's work led to a commendation at Meritorious Mast by the Squadron Commander, to an appointment as a Chief Petty Offiecer, and eventually to his commission as Ensign. (13)
The first training report made officially by VP-94 covered the period 3 March 1942 (date of commissioning) to 15 August 1942. Figures taken from it give an overall picture of the type but not the intensity of training that has been characteristic since the squadron commenced. (14)
7 flights of about three hours duration were spent in takeoffs and landings at Elizabeth City, North Carolina. 73 instruction flights of about two hours duration were made at Jacksonville during which 11 second pilots were soloed for local fair weather flights. 74 solo flights of about two hours each were made perfecting landings, instrument work and anti-submarine bombing. 86.3 hours of instrument flying were logged including solo pilots time. 52.9 hours of night training flights were used for landings. 185.6 hours of night flying were accomplished during operational missions. This included check-out of PPCs in night flying. 30 hours of radar training flights were registered. About 10 May 1942, 90% of the pilots participated in flights for observations of a submarine running at various depths in the Chesapeake Bay area. 59 flights of two to three hours duration each were made during which four crew members fired 50 rounds apiece at a float light and the pilots dropped 8 miniature bombs for A/S bombing practice. Each of ten PPCs made two flights practicing A/S bombing of a submarine in joint exercises at New London, Conn. About 8 miniature bombs were dropped on each flight. Each PPC made two or more "dry runs" and dropped two practice head torpedoes on the Narragansett Bay torpedo range. 32 Torpedos were dropped in all. 87.3 hours of 25 flights were devoted to navigation training. Ground training entered the picture as well with 749.8 hours completed in the link trainer. Lectures were given on A/S bombing, surface machine gun firing, intervalometer operation, small arms. All pilots attended a locture on board the U.S.S. Albermarle in conjunction with torpedo firing. Navigation lectures were given and all pilots other than PPCs were required to work a navigation problem each day. Communications, engineering, recognition and flight rules were also a part of the ground training program listed in this initial report. Successive training reports showed that a synthetic 3A2 gunnery trainer was in use; lectures were scheduled on operation of the M.A.D. and pilots were required to perform a set-up on the ground. Lectures were given in September 1942 by Lt. E.C. Smith who had returned from the anti-submarine warfare school at Boston, Mass. At the same time one officer and five radiomen completed a two weeks radar course held at the Naval Air Station, Jacksonville. Daily blinker practice was scheduled for all pilots who were not flying. (15)
The training program was momentarily interrupted in May 1942 when the squadron conducted a series of tests and made a formal report to the Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic Fleet on performance data for war planning purposes for model PBY5A airplanes. The submitted enclosure gave an absolute range for the airplane of 1990 nautical miles and a range for planning purposes of 1393 nautical miles. Endurance for absolute range was determined to be 20.9 hours; for planning purposes, 14.6 hours. (16)
Operational missions took up most of the available plane hours during VP-94s first months in South America. But advantage was taken of the land target at Natal and and the perfection of low level horizontal bombing in the PBY5A. By August 1943, tow target services were available with a PBY5A of utility squadron 4 based at Ibura Field, Recife. The Fourth Fleet added to the training aids in the South Atlantic area by September 1943, offering night look-out training at Camp Ingram, Recife; a synthetic anti-aircraft machine gun trainer; A/S land targets for aircraft at Recife, Fortaleza and Natal; an A/S diving target at Aratu; a plowshare target at Belem and a tame Brazilian submarine in a sanctuary near Recife. VP-94 was scheduled from time to time to make complete, simulated attacks on this friendly submarine throughout its stay in South America. (17)
By February 1944, lighter than air was established in Brazil and joint air-blimp exercises were scheduled. These consisted primarily of homing training with one or more blimps originating the homing transmissions and the Catalina's homing in. (18)
Survival training became a necessity, especially in the early days in Brazil, when the pilots were flying under undesirable conditions over jungles, mountains and ocean, with very few navigational aids. One of the most complete survival programs was held in August 1944 when the squadron commander and crew, including the mascot "Joe", the monkey, made an overnight survival trip to one of the inlets of the region. Survival training has been pointed at self-care and preservation, and use of the emergency equipment in the airplanes. (19)
By the time the squadron moved to Ipitanga in May 1944, operational hours were becoming fewer and fewer each month. An intensive training program was instituted as a result. Anti-submarine exercises were scheduled frequently, making use of both a fixed target and the towed target at Aratu The coast guard cutter there was also used in simulated night flare attacks. Each PPC was thorolughly checked out under the hood in daytime before attempting his runs on the cutter at night. The newer Pilots in the squadron were given a thorough grounding in all phases of PBY5A operation as soon as they reported in. Bounce drill (day and night) was scheduled, as well as instrument work, use of the radio range and other radio gear, navigation, formation flying, single engine operation, and water bounce. A homing exercise was also added to familiarize all pilots with the proper procedure to be followed in locating the transmitting aircraft. Training in the air has been supplemented on the ground. A lecture was scheduled for each morning meeting including technical discussions of the aircraft and its equipment, anti-submarine procedure and doctrine, recognition of ships and planes, enemy tactics especially as affected the submarine warfare department, gunnery, aerology, water work, and correct communications procedure. In November 1944 the squadron participated in a battle training problem ordered by CTF 44. Four of its aircraft were detailed to make a torpedo attack on two "enemy" carriers. The problem was complicated by the necessity for close cooperation with a variety of other aircraft including PBMs, PVs, and PBY4s. The simulated torpedo attack was launched just after the two carriers had swung into the wind, preparatory to landing aircraft. Previous to the battle training problem, a detachment of four FMs had been assigned to the squadron for fighter affiliation training. The training received proved of practical value, when the Catalinas were able to evade all but one of the "enemy" planes which made runs upon them. During the month of October 1944 the squadron completed 1167.7 hours of training in 8 aircraft and was specially commended in a gunnery memorandum issued by Fleet Air Wing Sixteen. The training schedule of that month included instrument flying, navigation, operational practice, night flying (including night bounce and night flare attacks), day flare attacks, plane to plane homing, fighter defense, formation flying, water bounce and familiarization. 44 aircrewmen completed a refresher gunnery training course and all squadron radiomen received training in blinker, radio check, transmitters, communication procedure, receivers and direction finders, radar and IFF. (20)
VP-94 took part in the refinement of the twin .50 calibre gun mount for the bow turret of the PBY5As which had been originally developed by VP-84. The VP-94 version had the advantage of an arc of fire 70 degrees in azimuth, 45 degrees depression and 30 degrees in elevation. Boost feed motors were installed so 1000 rounds of ammunition were made available instead of the previous 200 rounds. The mount was not accepted by the Bureau of Ordnance as a design for a twin .50 calibre hydraulic mount had already been accepted. The commanding officer was commended by Comairlant for "the initiative shown in the development of the twin .50 calibre manually operated gun mount." (21)
VP-94 has made several contributions to the tactics of anti-submarine warfare. At the time the squadron was commissioned, very little was known of the characteristics of the enemy U-boats and the propensities of aircraft in the war against them. As a result, airplanes were bombing oil slicks and air bubbles. As the picture became clearer however, the early mistakes were rapidly rectified and the submarine was put on the defensive. Shortly before it completed its tour of duty in the States, the squadron submitted a tentative anti-submarine doctrine for aircraft to the Commander Fleet Air Wings Atlantic Fleet. The gambit theory of luring a submerged submarine to the surface was especially noted and the squadron commander requested that all Army and Navy anti-submarine aircraft be made familiar with it. Further attention was paid to the use of radar and a request made for clarification of radar intercept by the enemy raiders. (22)
This tentative doctrine gave way to the VP-94 anti-submarine warfare doctrine in May 1943. It paid particular attention to radar use, methods of bombing a submerged submarine and evasion of anti-aircraft fire. Strict adherence to its principles where possible enabled the squadron to make the attacks of July 1943. (23)
Patrol Squadron 94 followed the normal pattern of organization throughout its career, with the only major change brought about by the introduction of headquarters squadrons into the Naval aviation organization. From the outset, Flight, Navigation, Engineering, Communications, Personnel, Training, Gunnery, Operations, Welfare and Recreation, and Buildings and Grounds Departments have been maintained. Formerly there were two other departments, Structures and Materiel, which concerned themselves with maintnance and supply matters. When Hedrons were organized these departments began to lose their identyity and were absorbed by Engineering. In the first eight months history of the organization, the squadron was complete unto itself. Attached to it were all kinds of service personnel equipped to care for all but the major mechanical overhauls of the aircraft. As a result, squadron movements were unwiedly. About October 1942, when Jacksonville was administrative headquarters these extra personnel were being detached to a new supporting command, Headquarters Squadron. By March of 1944, a new unit was realized with the establishment of the ASG (Aircraft Service Groups). These men were placed under temporary duty orders to the Squadron from the Hedron organization to assist VP-94 personnel in line maintenance and periodic checks up to the 240 hour check. The complement of non-flying offecers and enlisted men has varied almost from month to month. Non-flying officers of the former classification A-(V) S, D-(V) S and C-(V) S have been attached at various times, with A-(V) S in the majority Their work has been centered in such departments as Personnel, Operations, Gunnery, Communications and Training. Administrative detail has been handled by these officers as well. The squadron had had an ACIO as part of its complement since January of 1943, concerned primarily with Operations and Tactics and with such additional duties as voting and Squadron History. In its first months of operation VP-94 included amongs its enlisted personnel mess attendants, pharmacist mates, storekeepers, metalsmiths, electricians and boatswains in addition to the aviation rates. These were all incorporated into the Hedron organization so that today the yeomen attached to the squadron are the only ones who do not fly as part of their duties.
VP-94 has lost three of its Catalinas since the squadron originated. The first such accident occured in August 1942 during an administrative flight from Washington, D.C. to Charleston, South Carolina. Near Dahlgren, Virginia, the weather closed in and the plane crashed in an open field, killing all personnel aboard. They included:
Lt. Joseph Liana, USNR Ens. Alexander N. Belisle, USNR Ens. H.D. Webster, USNR Dunn, John Joseph, AMM2c, 690 50 08, USNR Masthay, John William, S2c, 266 50 24, USNR Elliot, Robert Frederick, S2c, 224 60 73, USN Remillard, Raymond Gesorge, ARM2c, 212 64 49, USN Drake, George Richard, S2c, 202 17 39, USN Deroche, Everett Erlon Joseph, S2c, 406 96 21, USN
On Sunday, 28 November 1943 at 2210 Peter, Lt. Theodore S. Stritter, USNR, 106 417, was dispatched from Belem as the Patrol Plane Commander in 94-P-10 to cover convoy JT-14. The remainder of the complement aboard included:- Lt. (jg) Joseph D. Engels, USNR, 114 335 Lt. Kenneth P Rauer, USNR, 106 640 Webb, E.J. Jr., AMM2c, USN, 262 62 36 Sexton, W.A., AMM3c, USN, 296 01 15 Johnson, L.D., AMM3c, USN, 552 00 43 Strickland, C.R., AMM3c, USN, 268 82 96 Stavros, D. (n), ARM3c, 212 75 89, USN Maher, W.F., ARM3c, USNR, 244 67 18 Cunniff, H.F., AOM3c, USNR, 213 98 96 The plane was last heard from 10 minutes after takeoff, checking communications with base radio. No further report was expected from the aircraft except for the convoy position report as of 0800 Peter 29 November. This was not received, but as at times a crowded circuit, radio failure or local static might prevent contact, no particular significance was attached to this departure from the routine. The plane was expected back by 0900 Peter and when this time passed, plans were formulated to start search at 1200 Peter, the absolute limit of endurance of 94-P10.The U.S. Army, Brazilian authorities, the Naval Observer, bases up and down the coast and outlying Brazilian towns in the Belem Area were alerted and an intensive day and night search was commenced. On 3 December at 0830 Peter, 130-B-7 sighted a wing tip float at 00-30 South, 48-30 West. A lightened PBY5A was sent to this position, but due to rought water was unable to taxi near the beach. A boat reached the spot 24 hours after the float was first seen. The float was recovered, along with other wreckage which included parts of the navigation table, camera box, radio tubes, pilots seat cushions and life raft paddles. These were scattered over a three mile strip of beach. From the appearance of the recovered wing tip float (starboard), it appeared fairly certain that the float was not in the up position at the time of impact. The float locking pin socket showed not signs of mutilation, which no doubt would be the case if the float had been up. This led to the conclusion that the pilot was attempting a forced landing. From other appearances of the float there were indications that the plane entered the water with the right wing low at a speed well over that necessary to keep the plane airborne. After 4 December all searches but beach searches were discontinued.
A recapitulation of the search follows: Flights (PBY5As, Blimp, Brazilian PBY5s and light planes) 89 Hours of flight 559.9 Distance flown 50,660 Hours over jungle area 137.5 Hours over water 207.5 Hours over beaches 212 Square miles searched (2.5 mile visibility) 253, 250
(24)
Earlier the same year, June 1943, VP-94 lost an aircraft during a forced instrument landing at night when the pilots did not know if they were over land or water, yet all aboard survived and injuries were few and inconsequential. 94-P-5 with Lt. (jg) Donald M. Faulkner, USNR, 112 146, as patrol plane commander, Lt. (jg) John T. Cline, USNR 114 446, as co-pilot and Ens. Herbert J. Greenberg, USNR 124 870, as navigator had commenced covering a southbound convoy from Amapa. At 0400 Peter 3 June 19 43 the pland departed Sao Luiz to recommence coverage at a point 200 miles east-northeast of the field. The plane was 45 minutes out of Sao Luiz, heading across the jungle and just out of the overcast at 900 feet when the starboard engine commenced popping. The tower reported oil pressure going down and seconds later the engine cut out completely and could not be feathered because of the lack of oil pressure. The pilots set course for the coast, losing altitude rapidly. Depth charges were dropped and gas was jettisoned on the port side. Below all that could be seen was light and dark splotchces, apparently water. The plane was brought in, in a power stall on instruments on what proved to be the side of a sand dune three miles inland. Gasoline was pouring out of the plane so it was abandoned immediatley. The co-pilots safety belt was not fastened at the time of empact, so he suffered the most severe injury, a gash over one eye. Otherwise injuries were confined to bruised legs, arms and hands. In side of two hours, over 200 natives had asssembled about the airplane. They offered coconuts and water to the pilots and crew, but the water had to be tactfully refused for fear of typhoid. Lt. (jg) Cline and an enlisted man set out for Miritiba, about 30 miles distant with the aid of native guides, in an effort to dispatch a telegram to headquarters at Natal. The trip was made on horseback, muleback, foot, and jangada and ended in a disappointment for the telegraph office was not in operation. The journey was resumed via jangada, up a river and down the coast to Sao Luiz. Meanwhile the gas tanks of the crashed airplane had been completely emptied except for 15 gallons, which was saved for use with the Auxiliary Power Unit (familiarly known as the put-put). Water breakers, liferafts, flashlights, and other material were salvaged. Radio communications were established after some effort and a very weak report as to position was sent to Natal. Five hours after the radio message was dispatched, another 94 plane appeared over the survivors, communicated with them by blinker and by radio and dropped a supply of food and blankets. The food was canned for the most part and promptly burst upon contact with the ground. A second 94 plane came in to investigate the crash and inquire as to means of rescue. The crew had inspected the plane and found an improperly secured oil cap come loose and that all the oil had been pumped out. Rescue was effected on 5 June when Lt. John B. Wayne, USN landed a PBY5A on a fresh water lake about three miles from the scene of the crash. The lake had been sounded by the navigator and found to be deep enought for a safe landing and take off. Accordingly, gangs of natives were organized to haul parts of the damaged plane to the lake for transport to Natal. Six trips were made by PBY5As of the squadron to haul out all usable equipment, including one engine, the wheels, the radio gear, etc. Detonators destroyed what was left except for the fuselage and wing. The port wing had been broken during the landing, as it trailed along the side of the sand dune. the bow was bashed in and the hull was partially sheared, laterally, at the number seven bulkhead. Ens. Greenberg found himself a second thrill, when he took off with Squadron Commander Lt. Comdr. Joseph B. Tibbets, USN, from Sao Luiz three days later. Five minutes out, a bad carburetor caused an engine failure and the plane would not hold altitude. Bombs were jettisoned before a landing was made in Sao Luiz bay. Part of the personnel was sent ashore in native boats. Lt. Comdr. Tibbets successfully took off for Sao Luiz after some his gas load had been dumped and the faulty carburetor repaired. Ens. Greenberg found it difficult to find flying companions for some length of time. VP-94 pilots have found themselves in other similiar ticklish positions during their stay in South America, but the planes and the personnel have always come back.. In June 1943, soon after the detachment was sent to Santos Dumont airport at Rio De Janeiro, Lt (jg) Fred R. West, USNR, 106 354, was dispatched on a night-long anti-submarine sweep. During his incoming leg, an oil line broke in the starboard engine and 1100 RPM was the most he could get out of it. The weather was very undersireable and as the coastal area was mountainous and no navigational were available, the plane was lightened as much as possible. First to go over the side were the dirty dishes. They were followed by bombs, guns, ammunition, drift sights... in fact, everything movable that could be spared. The plane approached the coast and circled until first light, when a successful landing was made at Santo Dumont airport. On 2 March 1944, 94-P-15 became stranded on the beach near Macau on the Northeastern coast of Brazil after running out of gas when Fernando Noronha was missed on the return leg of a long hop as a result of a compass error. Lt. James K. Buckwalter, USNR 113 065, and Ens. Charles T. Bauer, USNR, 250 964, made an excellent night landing on the water and then taxied up on the beach. A blimp stationed at Fortaleza was alerted and took off with four drums of gasoline each containing 50 gallons. It arrived over the stranded PBY5A at 1230 Peter 3 March. The drums were dropped from a height of 12 feet, while the blimp was held in a stationary attitude. Gassing of the airplane was completed with the help of 50 natives who had assembled to watch the excitement. On 21 November 1943, Lt. Richard J. Craig, USN, and Lt. John A. Cahill, USNR, 106 071, were dispatched f rom Fortaleza to Patos, a small settlement on the northeastern Brazilian coast to assist in the rescue of survivors of a VB 145 airplane that had gone down at sea off Fernando Noronha. Natives had picked up the pilots and crew members and were reviving them with native chicken soup. The PBY5A was landed in the open sea. The water seal was broken in the bow turret so the sea poured in. The pilots were able to make the beach however by going up a river with the wheels down. They found it feasible to wait for high tide at approximately 0100 Peter. The nose wheel had touched bottom by this time on the sloping river bed but it took some time to jockey the plane into position so the main wheels would get a solid grip and roll the aircraft onto land. Lt. Craig borrowed a native horse, once the plane was completely ashore and rode five miles to the native settlement where the survivors were located. He returned with the survivor who needed medical attention more than the rest and taxied the plane up onto the beach where he took off from the strip of sand for Fortaleza. The most recent single-engine operation occured while the squadron was preparing to leave South America and return to the United States. Lt. Gordon E Harbert, USNR, 117 045, departed Ipitanga at 0120 Peter 14 November 1944 on a ferry flight to Santa Cruz. One hour out away from base, he switched fuel tanks and his port engine cut out immediately. He turned back toward base but found it impossible to maintain altitude and was forced to land at sea eight miles from Bahia Bay. The lighting systems and the inter-communcation system both failed to function, so the landing was made in tatal darkness and with orders being yelled from one end of the plane to the other. Once on the water, the difficulty was remedied and the plane was flown back to base. Aboard the aircraft was a cruise box, the property of one of the squadron officers at the Santa Cruz Detachment. It was thrown overboard in an effort to lighten the aircraft and led to the following memorandum which was found on the All Officers Bulletin Board the following day:
FROM: THE STATESIDE KIDS TO: THE UNFORTUNATE ONE; (YOU KNOW WHO) SUBJECT: CRUISE BOX
1. We regret to inform you that subject cruise box is missing as of this date. Cause - marine disaster involving 94-P-9, Buno 46454. Details - At 0200 Peter, or thereabouts, at a position approximately 20 miles seaward of Ilheos, from an altitude of 8000 feet, before government property was thrown overboard, subject cruise box was jettisoned from said plane, and plummeted earthward at an estimated speed of 500 miles per hour, approximately the trajectory of the 12,000 pound "block buster". Upon contacting the Atlantic, the following articles are known to have spread over a large area: one umbrella, two bottles of Old Taylor, one gross of (censored), one photograph of the Warren High School graduating class of 1935, assorted uniforms, one dirty jock strap, one pre-war civilian suit. fifteen out-dated "C" ration gas coupons and one Esquire Club membership card. Subject cruise box subsequently resurfaced and then slowly settled, stern first, in 100 fathoms water. The swirl was marked by a Mk. 1 Mod. 1, depth charge marker and straddled by two Mk. 15 miniature bombs, (once again demonstrating the value of a concentrated training program. Two Mariners are emplying Steinhardt "hold down" tactics in the vicinity of the vaseline hair tonic slick, and will sink subject cruise box by gunfire to prevent falling into enemy hands, should it resurface. Native fishermen in Jangadas salvaged one Clark Gable type quick attachable type mustache. 2. Recommendation - that subject cruise box be stricken from the now famous list of VPB-94 cruise boxes.
GUESS WHO! BY DIRECTION. APPROVED: GUESS WHO: While the squadron was still based at Belem, in April 1944, a report was received that three Brazilians had seen an object closely resembling a periscope which proceeded down the Maracana River from Point S. Tome to the mouth of Cumara Creek against a very strong flood tide. It was trailed by a wake, as of a submerged submarine and sank beneath the surface and reappeared several times. The report also claimed that a fisherman and his son reported seeing what they thought was a searchlight playing briefly on the bank of the Maracana River at S. Tome Point. Officers of the squadron were sent to the area in a Coast Guard Cutter and made a complete investigation. Proof was found that a submarine had been in the river. However, the Squadron Commander, Lt. Comdr. Harold R. Swenson recommended to the Naval Air Facility at Belem that closer communications be established with the region so any future contacts could be investigated immediately. (25)
Since the squadron arrived in South America, it has had several differnt mascots, love birds, mongrel dogs (one of which was named Cerveja), an armadilla, a marmoset and a monkey. The monkey, whose name is "Joe" came from Peru. He was purchased by Lt. John D. Stapp, USNR 143 896, and resides in a specially constructed B.M.Q. (batchelor monkey quarters) in front of the squadron barracks. Two pet snakes are also quartered in the barracks area, one of them a six foot boa constictor. These however have been regarded as the personal mascots of Lt. Robert B. Finley, Jr., USNR, 112 028, for no one else will go near them. Four former officers of VP-94 have assumed commands of their own, stepping from Executive Officer of the squadron to their new commands. They include Lt. Comdr. Robert Hayes Smith, USN, VT(N)91; Lt. Comdr. Douglas Gray Parker, USN, VP-84;t. Comdr. William H Mcree. USN VP-74, and Lt. Comdr. Paul T. Weber, USN, VS 31. Two other VP-94 officers have been made commanding officers. Commander Lloyd M. McAlpine, USN, was commanding officer of Headquarters Squadron Nine and subsequently, of VB-114. Lt. Comdr.Harry Stott, USN, commands VPB-45.In October 1944, the squadron conducted a contest for a squadron emblem. The one chosen was designed by Carbone, Anthony Francis, 203 09 67, AMM3c, USNR. Lt. Comdr. H.R. Swenson brought to the squadron the Shellback initiation ceremonies for Pollywogs who had recently crossed the equator. These initiations usually lasted a full day and ended up with a beach picnic. Neptunus Rex and his court, properly arrayed and bethroned (usually on an amphibious jeep) saw to it that the Pollywogs appreciated their admittance into the ancient order of the deep.A BIT OF HISTORY: "1942-1943--This was a letter sent from Robert O. Hardy detailing his experiences. During the summer of 1944, Mr. Hardy was sent to the Pacific area of operations. He will continue his story later...U.S. Navy Anti-submarine warfare 1942-43...Mar 42 - Assigned to Patrol Squadron 94 Norfolk, VA. As aviation ordnance (Seaman), PBY-5A...Work on submarine patrols out of Norfolk covering the Atlantic (300-400 mile range)...Very inexperienced at this, little to no luck. Flew at 2000-4000 ft using binoculars and visual clues...Mar 42 - Squadron transferred to Quonset, RI...Patrols ran there towards Iceland, towards the North Atlantic...Installed first Magnetic Airborne Detection (MAD). This squadron was the first to utilize MAD gear...This required flying at 50-100 ft off the water. More successful at detection but no confirmed kills...Jul 42 - Squadron transferred to Jacksonville, FL...Missions flew from here towards Key West...Continued using MAD gear. Many detections with depth charge attacks but no confirmed kills...Richard Hardy" http://www.cybercreek.com/cybercity/WWIIps/sicil.html
Circa 1943-1944
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Collection of photographs from my Dads (ARNOLD, LCDR Richard M. "Dick") collection. A majority of Dad's time with VP-94 was spent at NAF Belem, Brazil (12/1943-12/1944)..." Contributed by Jack Arnold jack.c.arnold@att.net [27OCT2018]
LEFT to RIGHT: Dick Arnold-Belem-May 44, Buzzard Attack-Dick Arnold and Clancy Armanacki, L-R Ray Neal, Paul Bradley, Dick Arnold, Al Anselmo-Santa Cruz Br-Aug 1944, Christ the Redeemer overflight, Getting Brazilian wings-Dick Arnold, Parade-turning planes over to Brazil, one of Dad's planes and Richard Arnold Brazilian Wings.
This is short booklet that Dad made describing his experiences: The Navy As I Lived It 3.25MB PDF File
Circa 1943
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...My Dad, J Price Phelps was in VP-94 in 1943 & 1944 (at least), according to his logbook - signed by CO's Tibbets and Swenson. He was copilot (apparently they changed seats every other mission) with LT(jg) Frank Hare on 9 July 1943 when they caught a U-boat..." Contributed by J. Price Phelps JR litning@cox.net [24JAN2016]
My Dad, J Price Phelps was in VP-94 in 1943 & 1944 (at least), according to his logbook - signed by CO's Tibbets and Swenson. He was copilot (apparently they changed seats every other mission) with LT jg Frank Hare on 9 July 1943 when they caught a U-boat on the surface and prosecuted an attack. The sub fought back, killing Hare and wounding my Dad plus at least one other. Dad re-engaged dropped 2 depth charges that damaged the sub, forcing it to remain on the surface. The PBY remained nearby, called in for reinforcements, but ultimately had to RTB. Here's an account from the official report that I found online. I don't know if was ultimately labeled a "Kill".
At approximately 1230 Peter, 94-P-10 sweeping the area immediately east of TJ-1 sighted a surfaced submarine about 60 miles distant from the swirl sighting. Just after starting the first leg of the sweep at 1235 Peter, the co-pilot sighted the U-boat 12 miles distant at 03-54 North, 49-52 West. The submarine apparently did not see the plane until quite late for no attempt to submerge was made. At a distance of more than a mile from the submarine, orange flecks from the submarine's anti-aircraft fire were noticed, and almost immediately thereafter an explosive shrapnel shell entered the bow on the port side exploding against the instrument panel, setting fire to the Sperry oil, and causing billowing smoke and flame. The pilot, Lt. (jg) Frank Fisher Hare, USNR, 112 640 was struck by shrapnel in the head, heart, and body. The run was continued and the two starboard depth bombs released. Interrogation of those of the crew who could see the drop of bombs indicated that they landed close together, approximately 25 to 35 feet from the stern of the submarine and about 45 degrees to starboard. There was no visible indication of damage. The bow gunner fired his .30 calibre guns continuously during the approach and the port blister ;.50 calibre gun was brought to bear after the drop. About 20 to 30 minutes after the original attack, the plane departed, the submarine being still surfaced. The evaluation of the attack was "no damage." 94-P-1 and 107-B-5 investigated the area about 1300 Peter, but found no traces of the submarine.
The complement of the aircraft included:
Pilot - LT(jg) Frank Fisher Hare
Co-Pilot - LT(jg) Jean Price Phelps
Navigator - LT(jg) Michael Carl Argento
Tower - AMM3 Joseph Lombardo
Bow - AMM3 Clifford Eisaman
Starboard Blister - AOM3 Andrew Frank Testen
Port Blister - ARM3 Thomas Russell Brown
Radio - ARM3 James Thomas Lack
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...History of FAW-16 - History from 16FEB43-20DEC43 - Submitted December 29th, 1944. Squadron's Assigned: VP-45, VP-74, VP-83, VP-94, VP-107, VP-127, VP-129, VP-130, VP-134, VP-143, VP-145, VP-203 and VP-211..." Official U. S. Navy Records (National Archives and Records Administration) via Fold3 http://www.fold3.com/ [08DEC2012]
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Report of Antisubmarine Action By Aircraft. Report No. 4. 21 Jul 1943 - VP-94 - NAF Belem, Brazil - 94-P-14 - CFF..." WebSite: U-Boat Archive http://www.uboatarchive.net/U-662VP94ASW6_4_43.htm [12MAY2007] CONFIDENTIAL
III. APPROACH and ATTACK.
(ee) Enemy Action - The submarine opened fire almost immediately after the sighting, and the general observation was that the air was filled with bursts of smoke, some white and some dark, not very large, probably about two or three feet in diameter, but easily seen. Many tracers were also visible. One of the pilots received the impression that some of the bursts and tracers were from the same shell, although this was a necessarily vague observation.
The submarine did not change course or attempt any evasive action whatever, prior to the drop, although it may have increased speed somewhat. Immediately after the drop, the submarine started to zigzag, as the pictures indicate, and then it started to circle, presenting its beam to the plane throughout the running gun battle that followed.
All during the hour long battle the submarine continued to fire at the plane. While the plane was in close, the fire was heavy and continuous, the barrage effect being accentuated, the impression received by the pilot being that of receiving fire from multiple guns. When the plane reached a greater altitude, approaching 5,000', and a greater distance from the sub, the firing from the U/B was intermittent, there being only a few rounds fired every two or three minutes.
No apparent attempt at submergence was made until after the plane started away to lead the approaching escort vessel to the submarine, and then only after the plane was at a distance too great to make another attack before submergence could be completed.
It would seem that the submarine's actions in both this attack, and in the attack of 94-P-10 on July 9, 1943 might indicate that the U/B's have concluded that remaining on the surface while there is danger of attack is safer than attempting to submerge and being attacked while so doing. The circling during the time the U/B is subject to gunfire would seem to be a defensive maneuver, which might give some indication as to the direction in which its guns can bear.
NARRATIVE
On July 20, 94-P-14, PPC Lt. (jg) Auslander took off at 10:30 P from Amapa Brazil to relieve 94-P-8 on TJ-2.
The convoy was sighted at 1235 on course 1210T when the plane was at an altitude of 1800'. The pilot circled the escort leader, obtained the 1200P position of the convoy by blinker, and then climbed to 4000' while circling the convoy.
At 1259 the plane departed on course 1100(T) on a sweep ahead of the convoy. During this sweep, the 1200P position was sent to the base. At 1328 course was changed to 0540T. At 1333 course was changed to 3040(T) to head back towards the convoy. At 1341 the bow lookout reported a ship to port, ten o'clock, five miles. The position was 03-33N, 48-45W.
Lt. (jg) Auslander recognized it as an enemy submarine on course about 1140T, blew the warning horn, disengaged the automatic pilot, and signaled the tower to put the mixture control into auto-rich. The plane was nosed over and a turn to port started. Meanwhile, the co-pilot turned the bombing switch on an picked up the "pickle".
As the run was started, the air was filled with bursts of smoke and tracers. During the run, the navigator ran back to the blister for the camera, and the radioman started to send out the contact report. The throttles were pulled back, and the plane lost altitude and picked up speed as the pilot executed several skidding turns in order to evade the gunfire. About a mile away from the sub, the pilot leveled off briefly and then pushed over again on course 2400. The co-pilot, on signal from the first pilot, made the drop at about 100' and 165 IAS.
The pilot held his course briefly after pulling out, and then made a sharp turn to port. According to the Navigator, who was in the starboard blister, the drop was over, the bombs landing 30' to 50' over the submarine on the starboard side and slightly ahead. The pilot pulled up and the crew continued firing on the sub from blister guns and the bow gun. On scene of action voice frequency, the pilot called the escort vessels of the convoy which were close by, and at the same time the radioman was instructed to send MO's on 414Kcs.
The escort commander finally answered and was advised of the attack and position, and that the plane was sending MO's on frequency. Meanwhile, the plane was still firing on the submarine. Circling to port to give the port gun a chance to fire, and then to starboard for the starboard gun. The submarine continued to circle and return the fire. After about forty minutes he started on a zig-zag course, a very erratic one. At this time the plane had reached an altitude of 5000', visibility was unlimited; there were no clouds. The pilot felt that the escort would be able to see the plane at that altitude. A large wake heading for the plane's position was observed; so course was changed toward the escort. He was approximately 20 miles away making good speed. The after station kept watching the submarine which was still surfaced. When the plane was half way between the sub and escort vessel, the after station reported submarine was starting to submerge. The pilot immediately turned and dove on it with a green fluorescein dye marker ready to mark the spot. The U/B seemed to have difficulty submerging, as it seemed to go under, come up, go under, and come up again. It finally submerged at 1445P on course 1140T, and the marker was dropped. The plane, circling the sport, notified the escort vessels that the sub had submerged. The escort apparently discontinued his course towards the plane.
The pilot started to fly a 20 miles square around the point at which the sub submerged, and completed the circuit once. At 1610P P-14 was relieved by 94-P-12, and after indicating the spot where the dye marker was still clearly visible, the plane departed for Belem at about 1700P.
CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AT VP-94 BELEM, BRAZIL JULY 19 - JULY 21, 1943.
THE DATE GROUPS OF MESSAGES (M) ARE ZEBRA TIME; OPERTIONAL FLIGHTS (O) ARE PETER TIME
(O) 19th 0300P P-1 sent to cover JT-1 morning, return 1445P.
(O) 19th 0800P P-8 sent to sweep to 06-00N, 51-00W, locate TJ-2, Return Amapa 1530P. Cover AM 20th.
(O) 19th 0900P P-14 sent to sweep to JT-2 - Sweep astern - Return Amapa 1730P. Cover PM 20th.
(M) 190920 From P-1 05-30 posit. JT-1 00-08S, 45-37W.
(O) 19th 1045P P-4 sent to cover JT-1 PM, return 2020P.
(M) 191243 From P-7 No gas Sao Luiz, returning direct. (covered JT-1 PM of 18)
(O) 19 1600P P-12 sent to cover TJ-2 (right) return Amapa as ready plane 0640P 20th.
(M) 191720 From CTF44 Army attacked sub 1030P 05-06N, 48-40W. Night hold down.
(M) 191702 From P-8 TJ-2 1230P, 06-05N, 50-24.
(M) 191738 From CTF44 Army covering TJ-2 until 2200. Convoy diverted.
(M) 191845 To P-14 Army attacked sub - posit. 05-06N, 48-40W - follow previous instructions.
(M) 191848 To CTF 44 Covering TJ-2 tonight.
(M) 192055 From P-4 Posit TJ-1 00-15S, 46-02W, 1700.
(M) 192100 From P-14 Flat tire need wheel with tire mounted. Unable to cover tomorrow.
(M) 19th 2100P To P-14 Sending nose wheel early morning - arrange coverage.
(M) 192103 From CTF 44 Sub Monday "A" from B-24 attack 1030/19th 05-06N - 48-40W "B" 08N, 57W.
(M) 192103 To P-14, 12 Convoy diverted - change point "J" to 03-45N, 49-14W Advise Bock.
(M) 192159 From CTF 44 B-18 on TJ-2 reports U/B firing on plane 2130Z 20th 04-48N, 49-10W - Details attack
later.
(M) 192356 To CTF44 JT-1 00-05S, 46-02W 1700P - Convoy reversed for 3 hrs.
(M) 200206 From CTF44 What time do you expect to cover TJ-2. Do you need assistance?
(M) 200350 From P-14 Need side wheel not nose wheel.
(O) 20th 0350P P-1 sent to cover JT-1 return 1500P.
(O) 20th 0500P P-15 sent to Amapa with wheel, gas, cover JT-1 PM. Return 2200P.
(M) 200650 From P-12 TJ-2 - 0530P, 04-29N, 49-33W - My altitude is 1500'.
(M) 201010 From P-8 TJ-2 - 0700P, 04-00N, 49-36W - Ship.
(M) 201209 From CTF44 Cover JT-1 night 20th was practicable.
(M) 201321 To P-14 Start stern sweep plan 1600P. Finish outboard. Contact convoy. Return Para.
(M) 201324 To P-15 After 1400 modify sweep to outboard and ahead. Sub sighted 1830P Monday 04-48N,
49-10W.
(M) 201349 To CTF Your 200206 - See our 191720 and 191848, and 191851 covering tonight also x No
assistance needed.
(M) 201620 From P-14 TJ-2 1200P 03-40N, 49-25W.
(M) Tor 1650Z From P-14 Sub sighted 50 miles ahead of convoy.
(M) Tor 1650Z From P-14 Sub sighted, all bombs short - am circling and firing my guns -
position 03-22N, 48-37W. Will send MO's.
(M) 201709 From CTF44 P-14 dropped 4 short on sub 03-22N 48-37W - Circling and firing on sub. Relief on way
from Amapa.
(M) (TOR in Amapa) To P-12 14 attacked sub 1345P at 03-22N, 48-37W x Making MO's on Baker Two x Relieve immediately.
(M) 201725 From P-12 Out bill 1425P.
(O) 20th 1630P P-1 sent to cover JT-1 - Returned Amapa 0810P 21st Remain as ready plane.
(M) 201749 To P-8 P-14 attacked sub P-12 relieving x You return TJ-2 position 1500P - 03-25N, 49-05W
cover until 2200. Return Belem.
(O) 20th 1800P P-7 sent to cover TJ-2 (Returned 1030 21st)
(M) 201819 To CTF44 Relief now on contact and convoy x Covering both convoys tonight, plus hold down on
contact x JT-1 new ETA chop line noon Wednesday. Will cover only till noon unless
otherwise directed.
(O) 201820 From P-14 (Relayed to CTF44) 4000' - 5 miles port complete surfaced - 1140 sp.
10 position 03-33N, 48-45W - no dud - no evidence of damage. PLE Sub submerged 1445
position 03-28N, 48-48W.
(M) 201914 To P-12 Conduct hold down until dark then return Amapa if possible otherwise Belem. Advise.
(P-12 had been trying to arrange for night landings at Amapa.)
(M) 202030 From P-12 TJ-2, 1700P 03-45N, 49-02W - Request 2030 relief returning Para.
(M) 202045 From P-15 JT-1 - 1700P 01-40N, 48-37W.
(M) 202110 To P-14 Cover convoy until dark - return Belem.
(M) 202130 From CTF44 Estimate one sub 03-30N, 45-45 from attack. Possibly second in area.
(M) 202130 From P-14 Relieved by P-12 ETA 1915.
(M) 202358 To CTF44 Submarine submerged 1445P posit 03-28N, 48-48W on course 1140T TJ-2 1500 posit
03-28N 49-06W course 0350T Speed 7. Bombs dropped over repeat over x Plane all
ammunition expended x Plane shot up out of commission x hold down until 2030P x
Covering both convoys all night.
(M) 210145 From P-7 TJ-2 2230P 03-44N, 48-29W.
(O) 21st 0230 P-4 sent to cover JT-2 - Returned 1030P.
(O) 21st 0300 P-15 sent to cover JT-1 - Return 1545P
(M) 2210306 From CTF44 Bad D/F 210047Z within 150 miles 06-20N, 46-15W.
(M) 210419 To P-7 At 0430P send position info to #4.
(M) TOR 0930Z From P-4 0604 posit 03-50N 48-47W x Sub attacked one bomb hung will send MO's x.
(M) 210933 To P-7, 1 P-4 attacked sub 06-04P posit 03-50N, 48-47W.
(M) TOR 0948Z From P-4 Time 0604 posit 03-50N, 48-37W Receivers out - one bomb hung up - 4 survivors -
dropped raft - large oil slick - altitude 1000' - Believed sunk - Watson shot -
Will send MO on Baker Two.
(M) 210950 To CTF44 (unable to contact Natal for some time due to traffic)
P-4 attacked sub 0604P posit. 03-50N, 48-37W. Altitude 1000'. Dropped 3 one hung
up x 4 survivors large oil slick x pilot believes sub sunk x dropped raft x radioman
shot.
(O) 21st 0745P P-8 sent to cover TJ-2 return 2125P.
(M) 211105 From P-7 Have photographs of survivors P-4 sub returning to base.
(M) 211110 To P-1, 7, 4, 8 P-1 to Amapa, P-7 remain on convoy until PLE for Amapa, P-8 off at 0800 to
relieve on TJ-2 x P-4 then return.
(M) 211122 From CTF44 Good D.F. gives submarine fix today within 100 miles 03-00N, 47-30W.
(M) 21151 To CTF44 Amplifying x surfaced course 1800 spd. 12K corrected posit 03-56N, 48-56W x Plane
attacked from 1200' distance one and one half miles through AA and machine gun fire x
dropped from 75 feet intervalometer 80 foot spacing - three good one hung explosions
one port 10 feet two starboard 10 feet x sub sank immediately - nose up thirty degrees.
Very little forward speed, no debris, large oval stationary oil slick four survivors -
pilot believes definitely sunk.
1. This attack was well planned and apparently well executed. The crew that observed the bomb explosions think that the bombs fell over, but the pictures of the attack indicate a perfect straddle. Undoubtedly the submarine was damaged, but for some reason did not receive a lethal hit. The following day 94-P-4 attacked a submarine on the surface in the same location, making a successful run. This was probably the same submarine damaged in Peter 14's attack the day before and unable to travel far or fast during the night.
2. This plane expended all its ammunition strafing the submarine after the drop. In an hour's time the plane received but one hit by an explosive shrapnel shell even though it was close within gun range of the submarine most of the time.
3. According to the plane pilot's observations, the escort vessel that was dispatched from the convoy to contact the submarine returned to the convoy when advised by the plane that the submarine had submerged, even though he was only approximately 15 miles away. It seems strange that an escort vessel would disregard such an opportunity to bag a submarine.
J. B. TIBBETS Lieut. Comdr. USN Commanding.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON ATTACKS IN GENERAL
1. Comments on each separate attack have been previously submitted. The following comments will be based in general on the following sightings and attacks as a group:
94-P-7 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Bants Sighting
94-P-10 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Haro Attack
94-P-1 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Auslander Sighting
94-P-1 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Auslander Attack
94-P-1 July 10, 1943 Lt. (jg) Deutsch Attack
94-P-1 July 11, 1943 Lt. (jg) Deutsch Sighting
94-P-14 July 20, 1943 Lt. (jg) Auslander Attack
94-P-4 July 20, 1943 Lt. (jg) Rowland Attack
94-P-5 July 23, 1943 Lt. Weber Attack
2. All of those attacks were characterized by similar tactics on the part of the submarine--the definite decision to stay on the surface and shoot it out. All six attacks were made on fully surfaced submarines. Four of the six attacks met enemy fire. Of the remaining two attacks, one was apparently a complete surprise and the other was made during darkness.
3. Undoubtedly the submarines have received definite orders to remain surfaced and use their guns. In the past 15 days the submarines, using these tactics, have slightly damaged four planes--none completely out of commission--killed one officer pilot, and wounded one radioman. In return, during the same period, these tactics have afforded the planes the opportunity to make nine sightings, six of which resulted in attacks giving three possible sinkings. Our reaction is that the decision to stay surfaced and shoot it out is hard on submarines. We hope that the submarines maintain their present tactics.
4. The enemy fire encountered in these attacks is of a different type than my knowledge had led me to expect. There was little or no anti-aircraft fire from guns approximating 4" or 5" size. No large black or white bursts were seen. Tracers from smaller caliber guns were seen, and in each case small explosive bursts were seen well in front of the plane as well as close around the plane at various distances during the approach. Three planes were hit by bullets which exploded on impact about one foot after passing through the metal skin or fabric of the plane. After talking to the plane personnel, it is my opinion that the bullets used are slightly larger than .50 cal., come with or without tracer, explode slightly after contact, and also have a variable time fused explosion. Either the shells are filled with small shrapnel or else the body breaks up into shrapnel. I believe that these bullets can be set to explode at a given distance thus giving a barrage effect for an incoming plane. Once the plane reaches the barrage, the bullets then will explode upon contact. Probably the submarines have two of these rapid fire guns, one set for a close barrage, and the other to reach way out for the attacking plane before it reaches the barrage. These guns are mounted in or near the conning tower. The pictures of submarines in these attacks show a new type of submarine with a shielded gun aft of the conning tower. Evidently this type of submarine has orders to use its new armament against airplanes on the surface.
5. The three attacks which resulted in probable sinkings were all characterized by the same post-explosion action. The submarines were fully surfaced with personnel on deck at the time of the drop. The spray from the explosion completely hid the submarine. When the spray subsided the submarine was in one case completely gone, and in the other two cases only a small section of the bow was visible going straight down fast. In no case did more than two seconds elapse from the time of the explosion to the time of the submarine's disappearance. Either the submarines have a new submergence technique, or else their skins are thinner.
6. All but three of the nine sightings in the past two weeks have been made by the bow lookout who stands erect, head exposed, wearing helmet and goggles. Of the remaining three sightings, one was made by a pilot and the other two by radar at night. The lookout assignment in the planes of this squadron is bow lookout, pilots and tower. Any extra lookouts are placed in the blisters, but they are secondary and optional. The bow lookout is mandatory.
7. It has been proved essential to have the planes on station for escort duty well before daylight when night coverage has not been in effect, and also to be certain that the plane remains on duty until well after dark. While this has certainly for some time been the ordered in existence for daylight coverage, the practice in general has been to arrive about daylight and leave about dark, more or less.
8. It is interesting to note that planes on convoy coverage have made six sightings which resulted in three attacks and one probable sinking. Sweeps gave two sightings which resulted in two attacks with one probable sinking. A plane in transit to a convoy made a sighting which resulted in an attack and a probable sinking. It would seem from this that convoy coverage was more productive of sighting than sweeps. In most cases, however, the escorting plane found the submarine at a greater distance from the convoy than his escort plan normally would permit. If the planes had kept to the regular escort plan the entire time, the submarines would undoubtedly have shadowed the convoy during the day and caught up at night.
9. The submarine commanders must have excellent intelligence. Their concentrations were not only on the convoy routes but were also timed to be in the area where two oppositely bound convoys were due to pass. Apparently the subs lie quite a distance offshore, moving in only when the convoys approach.
10. Convoy coverage is productive of submarine contacts only, naturally, when the convoy passes through submarine areas. Definitely, the planes should always go to the submarines. When the submarines head for the convoys, the planes should proceed them. When the submarines leave the convoys for other areas, the planes should follow them.
11. The submarines undoubtedly have figured out the weaknesses of our present system of convoy escort plans and have commenced tactics to take advantage of those weaknesses. In these waters, for instance, the visibility is unusually good in good weather. The present escort plane is designed to prevent the submarine from closing in to attack the convoy while coverage is in effect. It also would prevent a submarine from coming in close enough on the surface, to sight and track the convoy from ahead or from the sides. It is not designed, however, to prevent the submarine from following the convoy during the day, tracking the smoke sightings from a distance astern greater than the escort plan carries the plane, and then overtaking the convoy during the night. Visibility of the convoy from the submarine is just as good from astern as from ahead, and the escort plan allows the submarine to come closer astern than ahead of the convoy. The submarine is content to trail astern during the day and attack during the night. Therefore a new escort plan should be designed not only to prevent a submarine from attacking during the escorting, but also to prevent the submarine from tracking during the escorting. This command is compromising at present by using the escort plan during the day until four hours prior to dark and sweeping astern, to the sides, ahead and then lastly astern again just prior to dark. In my opinion it is better to take a chance on the submarine attacking during the late afternoon and sweep to prevent him tracking for a sure attack during the night. When a convoy is passing through a threatened area and planes are available, the escort plan is continued till dark while a second plane sweeps at a greater distance from the convoy.
12. Airplane deficiencies were apparent in these attacks. Several of the attacks were made at speeds close to 200 knots. At this speed the bow gun becomes unmanageable because of the wind on the gun and gunner. If the bow gunner can shoot, the maximum number of rounds available on these planes is 100, the capacity of each pan. The entire armor installation on these planes is designed for protection from the rear. With the impact-shrapnel type of bullet the submarines are using, enemy fire from ahead into rear armor means certain shrapnel explosions in the exact area the armor is designed to protect.
13. The radar carried by these planes may be detected by the submarines. An improved type of radar is available. Our planes are now rotating for overhaul at Norfolk. So far they have all returned with the same radar that they took up North.
J. B. TIBBETS Lieut. Comdr. USN Commanding.
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Report of Antisubmarine Action By Aircraft. Report No. 5. 21 Jul 1943 - VP-94 - NAF Belem, Brazil - 94-P-4 - CFF..." WebSite: U-Boat Archive http://www.uboatarchive.net/U-662VP94ASW6_5_43.htm [12MAY2007]
CONFIDENTIAL
NARRATIVE
At 0230P, July 21, 1943 94-P-4 took off from Belem to relieve 94-P-7 on coverage of TJ-2, then about 300 miles from the plane's base. The plane arrived in the area and started a search for the convoy at about 0530.
At 0602, four minutes after turning to course 180T, a submarine was sighted at 03-56N, 48-46W by the bow watch DeNauw, relative bearing 030, distance two to three miles. The submarine was colored grey green with brown camouflage markings. It was moving on course 180T paralleling the plane's course at a speed of 5 to 7 knots. The deck appeared to be slightly awash with little wake showing. The plane was flying at an altitude of 1200' with an IAS of 95K. Immediately after the bow station's sighting, co-pilot, Lt. (jg) Jones, in the second pilot's seat picked up the visual contact, definitely confirming the bow's finding. PPC Lt. (jg) R. H. Rowland, rolled the ship slightly to bring the sub into view. The pilot's bombing switch was then closed, and the warning horn blown. Second pilot Lt. (jg) Anselmo manned the camera at the tunnel hatch and later at the port blister.
The bow watch went into action to prepare the .30 cal. gun, but he was unsuccessful in freeing the barrel group to allow the breech lock to disengage. The bow gun was not cleared throughout the run. The pilot immediately turned to attack, but seeing the trouble with the bow gun, and encountering heavy anti-aircraft fire veered slightly to port for a short period of approximately five seconds, then started a shallow diving run. Gunfire from the sub was persistent, forming a heavy barrage, lying two thirds of the distance from the sub to the plane with some projectiles apparently disintegrating at that pont. Others came through to meet the plane and exploded on contact. The rudder fin was hit at the base during final turn. A shrapnel shot was received at the chine of the hull at the radioman's station, when the plane was approximately one mile from the submarine. The path of this shot could be followed by tracer, and the ensuing explosion heard upon contact. Radioman Watson suffered lower leg and ankle injuries from this shot, but managed to pull himself to the blister and ask Garren to relieve him.
The run itself was routine, in that the pilot successfully tried to approximate the condition with which he had become familiar in practice bombing hops. Final course was 225T, speed 140 to 150K. An auto-rich mixture with power setting at 30 inches and 2300 RPM was used throughout the run. The sun's glow was approximately 1900 - 2000 relative to the plane's heading. The submarine remained on its original course with the same speed and running condition. Fire from the sub ceased just prior to the drop. At the time of drop from an altitude of about 75', Lt. (jg) Jones was able to view the conning tower close by to starboard. Lt. (jg) Rowland pressed the pickle, but the inboard starboard hung-up. Intervalometer setting for this drop was 80' at 160K. From reports of the crew, it seems that charges #1 and #2 landed so close that they exploded almost under port side just aft of the conning tower. During a shallow pull-out and turn to port, the bow of the submarine was seen by the PPC to be emerging from the geysers of water at a sharp angle.
The port gunner and the tower watch could both see the two port bombs enter the water and viewed the start of the explosions. Their account is clear and their story apparently accurate so that despite the use of the intervalometer, the spacing of the drop would seem to be less than the setting used. A slower speed than that for which the intervalometer was set would account in part for the proximity of the first two explosions. The starboard bomb was observed to drop to starboard of and ahead of the bow of the submarine at a distance judged to be about 30'.
The port gun was brought to bear and a full can was fired in long bursts. The pilot continued the turn for approximately one minute in order to remain in the immediate vicinity. Lt. (jg) Anselmo observed the sinking of the sub while the plane was in this turn at nearly 900 to release course.
Upon re-establishing sight contact with the spot, the pilot saw no submarine, but in its place an oval oil patch which increased in size to 200 yards in length and 150 - 175 width. Some brown streaks running through the oil darkened area were observed by the crew.
The longer axis of the oval crossed the sub's former course at approximately 90, probably because of the wind. Coming back over the dropping point for the first time, a definite circular slick could be seen in the middle of the increasing pool of oil. Whether or not this was a welling of oil is unconfirmed in the pilot's opinion.
The amplification report was prepared and sent blind to base although it appeared at that time that the G09 transmitter was out of commission as a result of the sub's fire. The CW receivers were not working, and it was impossible to tell whether the message was received. The flat top antenna was carried away, and the trailing antenna was temporarily out of use.
(page two of the narrative is missing)
CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AT VP-94 BELEM, BRAZIL JULY 19 - JULY 21, 1943.
THE DATE GROUPS OF MESSAGES (M) ARE ZEBRA TIME; OPERTIONAL FLIGHTS (O) ARE PETER TIME
(O) 19th 0300P P-1 sent to cover JT-1 morning, return 1445P.
(O) 19th 0800P P-8 sent to sweep to 06-00N, 51-00W, locate TJ-2, Return Amapa 1530P. Cover AM 20th.
(O) 19th 0900P P-14 sent to sweep to JT-2 - Sweep astern - Return Amapa 1730P. Cover PM 20th.
(M) 190920 From P-1 05-30 posit. JT-1 00-08S, 45-37W.
(O) 19th 1045P P-4 sent to cover JT-1 PM, return 2020P.
(M) 191243 From P-7 No gas Sao Luiz, returning direct. (covered JT-1 PM of 18)
(O) 19 1600P P-12 sent to cover TJ-2 (right) return Amapa as ready plane 0640P 20th.
(M) 191720 From CTF44 Army attacked sub 1030P 05-06N, 48-40W. Night hold down.
(M) 191702 From P-8 TJ-2 1230P, 06-05N, 50-24.
(M) 191738 From CTF44 Army covering TJ-2 until 2200. Convoy diverted.
(M) 191845 To P-14 Army attacked sub - posit. 05-06N, 48-40W - follow previous instructions.
(M) 191848 To CTF 44 Covering TJ-2 tonight.
(M) 192055 From P-4 Posit TJ-1 00-15S, 46-02W, 1700.
(M) 192100 From P-14 Flat tire need wheel with tire mounted. Unable to cover tomorrow.
(M) 19th 2100P To P-14 Sending nose wheel early morning - arrange coverage.
(M) 192103 From CTF 44 Sub Monday "A" from B-24 attack 1030/19th 05-06N - 48-40W "B" 08N, 57W.
(M) 192103 To P-14, 12 Convoy diverted - change point "J" to 03-45N, 49-14W Advise Bock.
(M) 192159 From CTF 44 B-18 on TJ-2 reports U/B firing on plane 2130Z 20th 04-48N, 49-10W - Details attack
later.
(M) 192356 To CTF44 JT-1 00-05S, 46-02W 1700P - Convoy reversed for 3 hrs.
(M) 200206 From CTF44 What time do you expect to cover TJ-2. Do you need assistance?
(M) 200350 From P-14 Need side wheel not nose wheel.
(O) 20th 0350P P-1 sent to cover JT-1 return 1500P.
(O) 20th 0500P P-15 sent to Amapa with wheel, gas, cover JT-1 PM. Return 2200P.
(M) 200650 From P-12 TJ-2 - 0530P, 04-29N, 49-33W - My altitude is 1500'.
(M) 201010 From P-8 TJ-2 - 0700P, 04-00N, 49-36W - Ship.
(M) 201209 From CTF44 Cover JT-1 night 20th was practicable.
(M) 201321 To P-14 Start stern sweep plan 1600P. Finish outboard. Contact convoy. Return Para.
(M) 201324 To P-15 After 1400 modify sweep to outboard and ahead. Sub sighted 1830P Monday 04-48N, 49-10W.
(M) 201349 To CTF Your 200206 - See our 191720 and 191848, and 191851 covering tonight also x No assistance
needed.
(M) 201620 From P-14 TJ-2 1200P 03-40N, 49-25W.
(M) Tor 1650Z From P-14 Sub sighted 50 miles ahead of convoy.
(M) Tor 1650Z From P-14 Sub sighted, all bombs short - am circling and firing my guns - position 03-22N, 48-37W.
Will send MO's.
(M) 201709 From CTF44 P-14 dropped 4 short on sub 03-22N 48-37W - Circling and firing on sub. Relief on way
from Amapa.
(M) (TOR in Amapa) To P-12 14 attacked sub 1345P at 03-22N, 48-37W x Making MO's on Baker Two x Relieve immediately.
(M) 201725 From P-12 Out bill 1425P.
(O) 20th 1630P P-1 sent to cover JT-1 - Returned Amapa 0810P 21st Remain as ready plane.
(M) 201749 To P-8 P-14 attacked sub P-12 relieving x You return TJ-2 position 1500P - 03-25N, 49-05W cover until
2200. Return Belem.
(O) 20th 1800P P-7 sent to cover TJ-2 (Returned 1030 21st)
(M) 201819 To CTF44 Relief now on contact and convoy x Covering both convoys tonight, plus hold down on
contact x JT-1 new ETA chop line noon Wednesday. Will cover only till noon unless
otherwise directed.
(O) 201820 From P-14 (Relayed to CTF44) 4000' - 5 miles port complete surfaced - 1140 sp. 10
position 03-33N, 48-45W - no dud - no evidence of damage. PLE Sub submerged 1445
position 03-28N, 48-48W.
(M) 201914 To P-12 Conduct hold down until dark then return Amapa if possible otherwise Belem. Advise.
(P-12 had been trying to arrange for night landings at Amapa.)
(M) 202030 From P-12 TJ-2, 1700P 03-45N, 49-02W - Request 2030 relief returning Para.
(M) 202045 From P-15 JT-1 - 1700P 01-40N, 48-37W.
(M) 202110 To P-14 Cover convoy until dark - return Belem.
(M) 202130 From CTF44 Estimate one sub 03-30N, 45-45 from attack. Possibly second in area.
(M) 202130 From P-14 Relieved by P-12 ETA 1915.
(M) 202358 To CTF44 Submarine submerged 1445P posit 03-28N, 48-48W on course 1140T TJ-2 1500 posit 03-28N
49-06W course 0350T Speed 7. Bombs dropped over repeat over x Plane all ammunition
expended x Plane shot up out of commission x hold down until 2030P x Covering both
convoys all night.
(M) 210145 From P-7 TJ-2 2230P 03-44N, 48-29W.
(O) 21st 0230 P-4 sent to cover JT-2 - Returned 1030P.
(O) 21st 0300 P-15 sent to cover JT-1 - Return 1545P
(M) 2210306 From CTF44 Bad D/F 210047Z within 150 miles 06-20N, 46-15W.
(M) 210419 To P-7 At 0430P send position info to #4.
(M) TOR 0930Z From P-4 0604 posit 03-50N 48-47W x Sub attacked one bomb hung will send MO's x.
(M) 210933 To P-7, 1 P-4 attacked sub 06-04P posit 03-50N, 48-47W.
(M) TOR 0948Z From P-4 Time 0604 posit 03-50N, 48-37W Receivers out - one bomb hung up - 4 survivors -
dropped raft - large oil slick - altitude 1000' - Believed sunk - Watson shot - Will
send MO on Baker Two.
(M) 210950 To CTF44 (unable to contact Natal for some time due to traffic) P-4 attacked sub
0604P posit. 03-50N, 48-37W. Altitude 1000'. Dropped 3 one hung up x 4 survivors
large oil slick x pilot believes sub sunk x dropped raft x radioman shot.
(O) 21st 0745P P-8 sent to cover TJ-2 return 2125P.
(M) 211105 From P-7 Have photographs of survivors P-4 sub returning to base.
(M) 211110 To P-1, 7, 4, 8 P-1 to Amapa, P-7 remain on convoy until PLE for Amapa, P-8 off at 0800 to
relieve on TJ-2 x P-4 then return.
(M) 211122 From CTF44 Good D.F. gives submarine fix today within 100 miles 03-00N, 47-30W.
(M) 21151 To CTF44 Amplifying x surfaced course 1800 spd. 12K corrected posit 03-56N, 48-56W x Plane
attacked from 1200' distance one and one half miles through AA and machine gun fire
x dropped from 75 feet intervalometer 80 foot spacing - three good one hung explosions
one port 10 feet two starboard 10 feet x sub sank immediately - nose up thirty degrees.
Very little forward speed, no debris, large oval stationary oil slick four survivors -
pilot believes definitely sunk.
(COVERAGE ON JT-1 WAS FINISHED 1200P 21st AND COVERAGE ON TJ-22 WAS FINISHED WITHOUT INCIDENT ON JULY 23rd.)
COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON ATTACKS IN GENERAL
1. Comments on each separate attack have been previously submitted. The following comments will be based in general on the following sightings and attacks as a group:
94-P-7 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Bants Sighting
94-P-10 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Haro Attack
94-P-1 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Auslander Sighting
94-P-1 July 9, 1943 Lt. (jg) Auslander Attack
94-P-1 July 10, 1943 Lt. (jg) Deutsch Attack
94-P-1 July 11, 1943 Lt. (jg) Deutsch Sighting
94-P-14 July 20, 1943 Lt. (jg) Auslander Attack
94-P-4 July 20, 1943 Lt. (jg) Rowland Attack
94-P-5 July 23, 1943 Lt. Weber Attack
2. All of those attacks were characterized by similar tactics on the part of the submarine--the definite decision to stay on the surface and shoot it out. All six attacks were made on fully surfaced submarines. Four of the six attacks met enemy fire. Of the remaining two attacks, one was apparently a complete surprise and the other was made during darkness.
3. Undoubtedly the submarines have received definite orders to remain surfaced and use their guns. In the past 15 days the submarines, using these tactics, have slightly damaged four planes--none completely out of commission--killed one officer pilot, and wounded one radioman. In return, during the same period, these tactics have afforded the planes the opportunity to make nine sightings, six of which resulted in attacks giving three possible sinkings. Our reaction is that the decision to stay surfaced and shoot it out is hard on submarines. We hope that the submarines maintain their present tactics.
4. The enemy fire encountered in these attacks is of a different type than my knowledge had led me to expect. There was little or no anti-aircraft fire from guns approximating 4" or 5" size. No large black or white bursts were seen. Tracers from smaller caliber guns were seen, and in each case small explosive bursts were seen well in front of the plane as well as close around the plane at various distances during the approach. Three planes were hit by bullets which exploded on impact about one foot after passing through the metal skin or fabric of the plane. After talking to the plane personnel, it is my opinion that the bullets used are slightly larger than .50 cal., come with or without tracer, explode slightly after contact, and also have a variable time fused explosion. Either the shells are filled with small shrapnel or else the body breaks up into shrapnel. I believe that these bullets can be set to explode at a given distance thus giving a barrage effect for an incoming plane. Once the plane reaches the barrage, the bullets then will explode upon contact. Probably the submarines have two of these rapid fire guns, one set for a close barrage, and the other to reach way out for the attacking plane before it reaches the barrage. These guns are mounted in or near the conning tower. The pictures of submarines in these attacks show a new type of submarine with a shielded gun aft of the conning tower. Evidently this type of submarine has orders to use its new armament against airplanes on the surface.
5. The three attacks which resulted in probable sinkings were all characterized by the same post-explosion action. The submarines were fully surfaced with personnel on deck at the time of the drop. The spray from the explosion completely hid the submarine. When the spray subsided the submarine was in one case completely gone, and in the other two cases only a small section of the bow was visible going straight down fast. In no case did more than twn seconds elapse from the time of the explosion to the time of the submarine's disappearance. Either the submarines have a new submergence technique, or else their skins are thinner.
6. All but three of the nine sightings in the past two weeks have been made by the bow lookout who stands erect, head exposed, wearing helmet and goggles. Of the remaining three sightings, one was made by a pilot and the other two by radar at night. The lookout assignment in the planes of this squadron is bow lookout, pilots and tower. Any extra lookouts are placed in the blisters, but they are secondary and optional. The bow lookout is mandatory.
7. It has been proved essential to have the planes on station for escort duty well before daylight when night coverage has not been in effect, and also to be certain that the plane remains on duty until well after dark. While this has certainly for some time been the ordered in existence for daylight coverage, the practice in general has been to arrive about daylight and leave about dark, more or less.
8. It is interesting to note that planes on convoy coverage have made six sightings which resulted in three attacks and one probable sinking. Sweeps gave two sightings which resulted in two attacks with one probable sinking. A plane in transit to a convoy made a sighting which resulted in an attack and a probable sinking. It would seem from this that convoy coverage was more productive of sighting than sweeps. In most cases, however, the escorting plane found the submarine at a greater distance from the convoy than his escort plan normally would permit. If the planes had kept to the regular escort plan the entire time, the submarines would undoubtedly have shadowed the convoy during the day and caught up at night.
9. The submarine commanders must have excellent intelligence. Their concentrations were not only on the convoy routes but were also timed to be in the area where two oppositely bound convoys were due to pass. Apparently the subs lie quite a distance offshore, moving in only when the convoys approach.
10. Convoy coverage is productive of submarine contacts only, naturally, when the convoy passes through submarine areas. Definitely, the planes should always go to the submarines. When the submarines head for the convoys, the planes should proceed them. When the submarines leave the convoys for other areas, the planes should follow them.
11. The submarines undoubtedly have figured out the weaknesses of our present system of convoy escort plans and have commenced tactics to take advantage of those weaknesses. In these waters, for instance, the visibility is unusually good in good weather. The present escort plane is designed to prevent the submarine from closing in to attack the convoy while coverage is in effect. It also would prevent a submarine from coming in close enough on the surface, to sight and track the convoy from ahead or from the sides. It is not designed, however, to prevent the submarine from following the convoy during the day, tracking the smoke sightings from a distance astern greater than the escort plan carries the plane, and then overtaking the convoy during the night. Visibility of the convoy from the submarine is just as good from astern as from ahead, and the escort plan allows the submarine to come closer astern than ahead of the convoy. The submarine is content to trail astern during the day and attack during the night. Therefore a new escort plan should be designed not only to prevent a submarine from attacking during the escorting, but also to prevent the submarine from tracking during the escorting. This command is compromising at present by using the escort plan during the day until four hours prior to dark and sweeping astern, to the sides, ahead and then lastly astern again just prior to dark. In my opinion it is better to take a chance on the submarine attacking during the late afternoon and sweep to prevent him tracking for a sure attack during the night. When a convoy is passing through a threatened area and planes are available, the escort plan is continued till dark while a second plane sweeps at a greater distance from the convoy.
12. Airplane deficiencies were apparent in these attacks. Several of the attacks were made at speeds close to 200 knots. At this speed the bow gun becomes unmanageable because of the wind on the gun and gunner. If the bow gunner can shoot, the maximum number of rounds available on these planes is 100, the capacity of each pan. The entire armor installation on these planes is designed for protection from the rear. With the impact-shrapnel type of bullet the submarines are using, enemy fire from ahead into rear armor means certain shrapnel explosions in the exact area the armor is designed to protect.
13. The radar carried by these planes may be detected by the submarines. An improved type of radar is available. Our planes are now rotating for overhaul at Norfolk. So far they have all returned with the same radar that they took up North.
J. B. TIBBETS
Lieut. Comdr. USN
Commanding.
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 31 May 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [02OCT2006]
VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED
CASU
PATSU
VD-1, VD-2 and VD-3
VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-7 and VJ-10
VP-1
VP-11, VP-12, VP-13, VP-14 and VP-15
VP-23
VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34
VP-43, VP-44 and VP-45
VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54
VP-61, VP-62 and VP-63
VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74
VP-81 and VP-84
VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94
VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109
VP-125, VP-126, VP-127 and VP-128
VP-130, VP-131, VP-132, VP-133, VP-134, VP-135, VP-136, VP-137, VP-138 and VP-139
VP-140, VP-142, VP-144 and VP-146
VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209
VP-210, VP-211 and VP-212
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 16 Jan 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [01OCT2006]
VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED
CASU and PATSU
VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-6, VJ-7 and VJ-8
VP-6 Coast Guard
VP-3
VP-11 and VP-12
VP-23 and VP-24
VP-31, VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34
VP-41, VP-42, VP-43 and VP-44
VP-51, VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54
VP-61, VP-62 and VP-63
VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74
VP-81, VP-82, VP-83 and VP-84
VP-91, VP-92VP-93, and VP-94
VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109
VP-110
VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129
VP-131, VP-132, VP-133 and VP-134
VP-200, VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209
VP-210, VP-211, VP-210, and VP-216
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 09 Nov 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [01OCT2006]
VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED
CASU and PATSU
VD-1, VD-2, VD-3 and VD-4
VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-15, and VJ-16
VP-6 Coast Guard
VP-1
VP-11, VP-12, VP-13, VP-14, VP-15 and VP-16
VP-23 and VP-24
VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34
VP-43, VP-44 and VP-45
VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54
VP-61, VP-62 and VP-63
VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74
VP-81 and VP-84
VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94
VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109
VP-110, VP-111, VP-112, VP-113, VP-114, VP-115 and VP-116
VP-125, VP-126, VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129
VP-130, VP-131, VP-132, VP-133, VP-134, VP-135, VP-136, VP-137, VP-138 and VP-139
VP-140, VP-141, VP-142, VP-143, VP-144, VP-145, VP-146, VP-147, VP-148 and VP-149
VP-150
VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209
VP-210, VP-211, VP-212, VP-213, VP-214, VP-215 and VP-216
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 09 Feb 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [28SEP2006]
VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED
VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-7 and VJ-8
VP-11, VP-12, VP-13 and VP-14
VP-23 and VP-24
VP-31, VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34
VP-41, VP-42, VP-43 and VP-44
VP-61, VP-62, and VP-63
VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74
VP-81, VP-82, VP-83 and VP-84
VP-91, VP-92, VP-93 and VP-94
VP-101
VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129
VP-130, VP-132, VP-133 and VP-134
VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209,
VP-210, VP-211 and VP-212
A BIT OF HISTORY: APPENDIX 3 Submarines Sunk by Patrol Squadrons During World War II - Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/dictvol2.htm [04MAY2001]
U-590, 9 July 1943 Type: VIIC Laid Down: 31 October 1940, Blohm & Voss, Hamburg Commissioned: 2 October 1941, Kptlt. Heinrich Müller-Edzards Commander: October 1941 June 1943, Kptlt. Heinrich Müller-Edzards; June 1943 July 1943, Oblt. Werner Krüer Career: Assigned: October 1941 April 1942, 6th Flotilla (Danzig); April 1942 July 1943, 6th Flotilla (St. Nazaire) Successes: One ship of 5,228 tons sunk
Fate: Sunk on 9 July 1943, in the mid-Atlantic near the Amazon estuary, in position 03°22'N, 48°38'W, by bombs from a PBY-5A Catalina of VP-94. 45 dead (entire crew lost). Lieutenant S. Auslander, from the Belem detachment of VP-94, attacked and sank U-590.
A BIT OF HISTORY: APPENDIX 3 Submarines Sunk by Patrol Squadrons During World War II - Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/dictvol2.htm [04MAY2001]
U-662, 21 July 1943 Type: VIIC Laid Down: 7 May 1941, Howaldtswerke, Hamburg Commissioned: 9 April 1942, Kptlt. Wolfgang Hermann Commander: April 1942 February 1943, Korvkpt. Wolfgang Hermann; March 1943 July 1943, Oblt. Heinz-Eberhard Müller Career: Assigned: April 1942 September 1942, 5th Flotilla (Kiel); October 1942, 7th Flotilla (St. Nazaire) Successes: Three ships sunk for a total of 18,094 tons; one ship of 7,174 tons damaged Fate: Sunk 21 July 1943, in the Atlantic off Dutch Guiana, in position 03°56'N, 48°46'W, by bombs from a VP-94 PBY-5A Catalina. 44 dead. Lieutenant R. H. Rowland, from the Belem detachment of VP-94, attacked and sank U-662. Lieutenant Rowland's crew dropped life rafts for the survivors. The U-boat captain, Oblt. Heinz-Eberhard Müller, and three other crewmembers were fished out of the sea after 17 days by PC 494, Task Force 2.
A BIT OF HISTORY: APPENDIX 3 Submarines Sunk by Patrol Squadrons During World War II - Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/dictvol2.htm [04MAY2001]
U-199, 31 July 1943 Type: IXD Laid Down: 10 October 1941, AG Weser, Bremen Commissioned: 28 November 1942, Kptlt. Hans-Werner Kraus (Knights Cross) Commander: November 1942 July 1943, Kptlt. Hans-Werner Kraus Career: One patrol; assigned: November 1942 May 1943, 4th Flotilla (Stettin); May 1943 July 1943, 12th Flotilla (Bordeaux) Successes: One ship sunk for a total of 4,161 tons Fate: Sunk 31 July 1943, east of Rio de Janeiro, inposition 23°45'S, 42°54'W, by a Brazilian PBY-5A Catalina flown by a trainee pilot, Cadet A. Torres, assigned to VP-94. The U-boat went down in the Atlantic off Cape Frio, Brazil. 49 dead, 11 survivors. The survivors ended up in Brazilian and then U.S. captivity.
A BIT OF HISTORY: "09JUL43--German submarine sunk: U-590, by naval land-based aircraft (VP-94), mouth of Amazon River, Brazil, 03 d. 22' N., 48 d. 38' W...." http://www.pagesz.net/~jbdavis/navy_43.txt
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...On 9 July 1943, Lt(jg) S.E. Auslander, in a Brazilian based PBY-5A, 94-P-1, BuNo ????, of VP-94 USN, attacked and sank U-590 in position 0322N 4838W (about 170 NM northeast of the Amazon estuary) with 6 depth charges..." Contributed by Ragnar J. Ragnarsson ragsie@centrum.is [03JAN2000]
A BIT OF HISTORY: "21JUL43--German submarine sunk: U-662, by naval land-based aircraft (VP-94), mouth of Amazon River, Brazil, 03 d. 36' N., 48 d. 46' W...." http://www.pagesz.net/~jbdavis/navy_43.txt
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...To counter the menace of the U-boat offensive in the South Atlantic, the USA deployed air groups to Brazilian bases in the Northeast. In January 1943, the US Navy VP-74, VP-83 and VP-94 were based at Natal - by mid-1943 there were five USN groups and by the end of the year five others arrived. These began to be replaced by Brazilian units as soon as the FAB personnel had completed their training and more aircraft were received..."http://www.mat.ufrgs.br/~rudnei/FAB/eng/patrulha.html http://www.mat.ufrgs.br/~rudnei/FAB/eng/u-boote.html
Circa 1942-1945
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...History of FAW-5 - History of Headquarters Squadron Fleet Air Wing Five - 01SEP42 through 01JAN45. Squadron's Assigned: VP-15, VP-16, VP-17, VP-18, VP-21, VP-22, VP-25, VP-26, VP-27, VP-28, VP-31, VP-52, VP-63, VP-81, VP-92, VP-94, VPB-105, VPB-107, VPB-110, VPB-111, VPB-112, VPB-113, VPB-114, VPB-126, VPB-134, VPB-147, VPB-149, VP-201, VP-205, VP-208, VP-209, VP-210, VP-211, VP-212, VP-213, VP-214, VP-215 and VP-216 - Submitted Feburary 1, 1945..." Official U. S. Navy Records (National Archives and Records Administration) via Fold3 http://www.fold3.com/ [27NOV2012]
A BIT OF HISTORY: Naval Historical Center, Department Of The Navy, Washington, D. C http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/dictvol2.htm [28APR2001]
VPB-94 122KB
Circa 1942
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Op-40-A-KB - (SC)A6-4/VZ - January 6, 1942 - Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [23SEP2006]
VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED
VP-11, VP-12 and VP-14
VP-23 and VP-24
VP-31, VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34
VP-41, VP-42, VP-43 and VP-44
VP-51, VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54
VP-61, VP-62, VP-63
VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74
VP-81 and VP-83
VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94
VP-101
VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208, VP-209, VP-210, VP-211 and VP-212
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Patrol Wings - Rear Admiral A. D. Bernhard - August 1942..." Contributed by John Lucas JohnLucas@netzero.com [28DEC2005]
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Albemarle - DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/a5/albemarle-iii.htm [09APR2005]
Albemarle
A town and a sound in North Carolina and a county in Virginia. All three were named for General George Monck, the first Duke of Albemarle and one of the original Carolina proprietors
III
(AV-5: dp. 8,761; 1. 527'4"; b. 69'3"; dr. 21'11"; s. 19.7 k.; cpl. 1,195; a. 4 5", 8 .50-cal. mg.; cl. Curtiss
The third USS Albemarle (AV-5) was laid down on 12 June 1939 at Camden, N.J., by the New York Shipbuilding Corp.; launched on 13 July 1940; sponsored by Mrs. Beatrice C. Compton, the wife of the Honorable Lewis Compton, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and commissioned at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 20 December 1940, Comdr. Henry M. Mullinnix in command.
Albemarle remained at Philadelphia, fitting out, through mid-January, 1941. Underway for Newport, R.I., on the morning of 28 January, the seaplane tender arrived at her destination on the 30th, and loaded torpedoes. She sailed the following day for Norfolk, arriving on 1 February, and over the ensuing days remained in that area, loading bombs and pyrotechnics and calibrating her degaussing gear, before she sailed on her shakedown cruise on the afternoon of 6 February, setting course for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The seaplane tender shifted thence to Havana on the morning of 18 February, and over the days which followed her captain made the usual formal calls dictated by diplomatic protocol. In Havana harbor, Albemarle dressed ship for Washington's Birthday, her 21-gun salute to the American national holiday returned gun-for-gun by the Cuban gunboat Yarn. On the morning of 24 February, the ship got underway for the Canal Zone.
Diverted while en route, Albemarle anchored in the harbor at San Juan, Puerto Rico, on the morning of 28 February, and that afternoon received the official call of Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commandant of the 10th Naval District. That same day, she embarked 91 men from VP-51 and VP-61 from VP-52 for temporary duty and transportation, and sailed for Norfolk, Virginia on the morning of 2 March. While en route, Comdr. Mullinnix was relieved as commanding officer by Comdr. H. B. Sallada.
Albemarle moored at Pier 7, Naval Operating Base (NOB) Norfolk, Virginia, on the afternoon of 5 March, but lingered there for less than a day, getting underway the following afternoon for Philadelphia. She returned to the Philadelphia Navy Yard and spent the rest of March there, undergoing post-shakedown repairs.
The seaplane tender departed Philadelphia on 6 April, and arrived back at Norfolk, Virginia the following afternoon; there she took on board depth charges and depth bombs. She sailed for Newport on the morning of 10 April, and soon after standing out into international waters past the Virginia capes, met her escort for the trip—six "flush-deck" destroyers, one of which was the ill-fated Reuben James (DD-245). That afternoon she fueled two of her escorts, Sturtevant (DD-240) and MacLeish (DD-220) at the same time, the former to starboard, the latter to port.
Albemarle then anchored in the harbor of refuge, off Block Island, late on the afternoon of 11 April and, accompanied by the destroyer Truxtun (DD-229), calibrated her radio direction finders. She then set out to finish her voyage up the eastern seaboard to Newport, arriving at her destination late on the afternoon of 13 April. She there joined a host of warships, ranging from the battleship Texan (BB-35) and the heavy cruisers Tuncaloosa (CA-37) and Wichita (CA^IS) to old and new-type destroyers and the destroyer tender Prairie (AD-15).
While Albemarle had been on her shakedown, the United States determination to aid the British in the Battle of the Atlantic had resulted in the establishment, on 1 March, of the Support Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Arthur LeRoy Bristol, to protect the vital lifeline between the United States and Great Britain in the North Atlantic. It was formed around destroyers and patrol plane squadrons; the latter would be tended by small seaplane tenders (ex-destroyers and ex-minesweepers) and Albemarle.
Over the next few days, the seaplane tender operated in local waters, at Narragansett Bay, off Martha's Vineyard and Quonset Point, Rhode Island, running drills of various kinds and conducting target practices. Rear Admiral Bristol came on board briefly on 28 April and wore his flag in Albemarle; that same day, she embarked her former commanding officer, now Capt. Mullinnix, who was now Commander, Patrol Wing, Support Force; men of VP-56 reported on board in connection with advanced base operations, as did men from VP-55. The following day, the planes from those two squadrons commenced night-flying operations.
Albemarle, after again wearing Rear Admiral Bristol's flag on 2 May, departed Newport for Norfolk, Virginia on 4 May, arriving the following day. The seaplane tender then cleared the Virginia capes on the morning of 9 May for Newport, and arrived there the following morning. She embarked officers and men of VP-52 on 12 May and then sailed the following morning (13 May) for Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada. Ultimately anchoring in Little Placentia Bay, Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada, on the morning of 18 May, Albemarle was soon laying 13 seaplane moorings and gathering data on the weather of the region, establishing the advanced base for VP-52's operations from Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada.
Over the days that followed, in addition to tending the planes assigned to her, she also fueled a succession of destroyers. On 20 May, she received a visit from not only Rear Admiral Bristol— his first visit to Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada, which he later made his headmarters— but Rear Admiral John H. Towers, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, who both arrived separately in planes from VP-56. Both flag officers departed the following morning.
Twelve PBYs of VP-52 arrived at Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada from Quonset Point, Rhode Island on 18 May, and immediately commenced familiarization flights in the region—activities which were suddenly cancelled on 24 May. On that day, the German battleship Bismarck, which had left Norwegian waters shortly before in company with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eiu/en on what was to be a raiding cruise into the Atlantic, encountered and destroyed the British battle cruiser HMS Hood. An anxious Prime Minister Winston Churchill, concerned over the convoy routes that lay open to the powerful German battleship, immediately cabled President Roosevelt and requested American help.
Albemarle quickly refueled the aircraft that had been flying training missions that morning and readied others for the urgent mission. At 1440 the first group of four PBYs lifted off, followed a little less than three hours later, at 1720, by a second flight of seven. The pilots of the "Catalinas" were briefed for a long reconnaissance mission that would take them some 500 miles southeast of Cape Farewell, Greenland. They encountered foul weather and very dangerous flying conditions in the course of their extensive searches, did not find their quarry in the murk, and were compelled by the fog and darkness to seek haven at various bays in Newfoundland, Labrador, Quebec, and adjoining islands.
Albemarle remained at Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada until 12 June, when she sailed for Norfolk, Virginia, arriving on the 15th. There she loaded supplies, stores, ammunition and gasoline, before getting underway to return to Newfoundland on 20 June. Escorted there by the destroyer MacLeish, Albemarle touched at Halifax en route (22 June), and then proceeded on to Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada, screened by MacLeish and Cole (DD-155), arriving on 24 June. The seaplane tender supported the operations of VP-71, VP-72 and VP-73 until she sailed again for Norfolk, Virginia on 19 July, in company with Dallas (DD-199). Mooring at Pier 7, NOB Norfolk, Virginia on the morning of the 25th, she shifted to the Norfolk, Virginia Navy Yard later that same day and remained there, undergoing an availability, until 12 August.
Underway on the day, Albemarle, screened by the destroyer Broome(DD-210), sailed for Angentia once more, and reach her destination on the 16th, resuming her support of VP-73. She provided support for seaplane and flying boat operations out of Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada through October, 1941. Clearing Little Placentia Harbor on 1 November, Albemarle sailed for Casco Bay, Maine, arriving there on the 3d; she then pushed on for Norfolk, Virginia, arriving there on the 7th.
On the day that Japanese planes attacked the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 7 December 1941, Albemarle lay at NOB Norfolk, Virginia, embarking passengers before she was scheduled to get underway for anchorage at Lynnhaven Roads. On Christmas Day, 1941, the seaplane tender got underway for Newport and Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada.
Ultimately, the ship proceeded to Reykjavik, Iceland, where she would encounter the most severe weather she would see in her career. One particular day, 15 January 1942, was memorable. She set her special sea, anchor and steaming watches and put out both anchors with 120 fathoms of chain on the starboard and 60 to port, with her main engines turning over and steam up on all boilers. The winds were clocked at 71 knots, with occasional gusts of 95, forcing the tender to drag anchor.
The gale lasted until 19 January, and caused heavy damage among the ship's patrol planes. The ship nearly collided with Wichita on one occasion, and was in danger of fouling several other ships during that time. Her starboard anchor was fouled once, and she lost the port anchor. She ultimately left Reykjavik on 19 January, steaming initially at greatly reduced speed because of the tempest, shaping course for Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada, where she would embark passengers for transportation to Norfolk, Virginia.
Reaching Norfolk, Virginia on 29 January, Albemarle then proceeded to Narraganasett Bay, and there provided tender services to VP-73 as that squadron worked with torpedoes there. On 5 March, Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, made an unofficial call and inspected the ship informally. Albemarle completed her work with VP-73 and remained at anchor in Narragansett Bay until 3 April, when she proceeded to the Boston Navy Yard South Annex for an availability. Her overhaul lasted until 1 May 1942.
Upon completion of her refit, Albemarle got underway for Newport, on 5 May, and there, over the next few days, degaussed, calibrated her direction finders, and loaded aircraft for transportation to Bermuda. Underway on 15 May with Mayo (DD-422) and Benson (DD-421) as escorts, the seaplane tender reached her destination on the 17th, unloaded the planes she had brought, and immediately set sail for Narragansett Bay.
Relieving USS Pocomoke (AV-9) in connection with aircraft torpedo and submarine familiarization training, on the 19th, Albemarle remained anchored in Narragansett Bay until 12 August, providing torpedo services for a succession of squadrons: VP-94, VP-34, VP-33 and Torpedo Squadron 4. Underway on 12 August and escorted by the destroyers Livermore (DD-430), Kearny (DD-432) and Rowan (DD-405), the submarine tender sailed for Norfolk, Virginia. After her arrival there, Albemarle conducted gunnery exercises in the Chesapeake Bay operating area.
Shortly thereafter, escorted by Fletcher (DD-445) and O'Bannon (DD-450), Albemarle sailed for the Canal Zone on 5 September 1942. Damaging her starboard screw at Coco Solo, Panama, Canal Zone, the seaplane tender was ordered drydocked for repairs; after transiting the Panama Canal for the first time on 15 September, she entered dry dock at Balboa on the following day. Upon completion of repairs, she transported Army troops and marines to Rio Hato, Panama, for two days of joint Army-Navy maneuvers.
Over the next several months, Albemarle acted as fast transport of aeronautical material and men to naval air bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific coast of South America, as well as in the northern South Atlantic. During this time (September-November 1942), she visited Salinas, Ecuador; the air base at Seymour Island, in the Galapagos Islands; San Juan and Bermuda, primarily operating out of Colon and Balboa and escorted by the seaplane tender Goldsboroygh (AVD-5).
Relieved on station by the seaplane tender USS Pocomoke (AV-9), Albemarle sailed from the Canal Zone on 13 November 1942, escorted by Goldsborough and the small seaplane tender Matagorda (AVP-22). Proceeding via San Juan, Trinidad and Bermuda, the seaplane tender reached Hampton Roads on 30 November having completed her longest sustained tour of duty outside the continental limits of the United States.
Over the next seven months, Albemarle shuttled between Norfolk, Virginia and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Trinidad, British West Indies, San Juan, and Bermuda, on eight round-trip voyages. She varied this routine only slightly on the sixth and eighth of these, visiting Recife, Brazil for the first time (17 to 21 April 1943) on the sixth cruise and putting into the Canal Zone on the eighth. Her cargo included aviation gasoline and ammunition. Upon completion of that cycle of operations, she underwent repairs and alterations at the Boston Navy Yard between 15 June and 23 July 1943, departing on the latter date for Norfolk, Virginia, whence she resumed her cargo-carrying and transport run to Trinidad, Recife, San Juan and Guantanamo Bay. On this voyage, her last on this run, she brought back 27 German prisoners of war, survivors of a sunken U-boat.
Underway from Norfolk, Virginia on 16 September 1943, Albemarle sailed for the British Isles, escorted by the destroyers Bulmer (DD-222) and Barker (DD-213). Proceeding via Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada, the seaplane tender reached Swansea, Wales, with aeronautical cargo and passengers on 28 September, the men and freight she carried to support the newly inaugurated antisubmarine operations by patrol squadrons operating from the British Isles. Underway from Swansea on 4 October, she scraped a screw while leaving the harbor, and, after sailing via Argentia, Newfoundland, Canada, reached Boston on 15 October. She was drydocked the following day, and the damaged propeller was repaired. Albemarle returned thence to Norfolk, Virginia via the Cape Cod Canal, arriving at Norfolk, Virginia on 18 October.
Underway on 22 October as part of a task group formed around the escort carrier Croatan (CVE-25) and three destroyers, Albemarle sailed for Casablanca. Routed via Bermuda, the group reached its destination on 3 November. After discharging her cargo and disembarking her passengers, the seaplane tender then sailed for the United States on 10 November with another convoy, this one larger and formed around Croatan and the light cruiser Philadelphia (CL-41), escorted by seven destroyers, and containing Matagorda and three transports.
Albemarle made a second cruise to Casablanca before the year 1943 was out, underway on 28 November and escorted by the destroyers Barry (DD-248) and Goff (DD-247), and arriving on 7 December. She sailed on the 13th for Reykjavik, and reached that Icelandic port on the 19th. There she embarked men from VB-128 for transportation back to the United States, and proceeded out of Reykjavik on 22 December for Norfolk, Virginia. Battling heavy seas on the return voyage (making only five knots on Christmas Day), Albemarle returned to NOB, Norfolk, Virginia, on the last day of the year 1943.
Proceeding thence to Bayonne, N.J., on 4 January 1944, for upkeep and availability, Albemarle returned to Norfolk, Virginia on 17 January, and prepared for a voyage to San Juan. While outward-bound, however, on 18 January 1944, the seaplane tender fouled a buoy in a thick fog and put about for repairs. Drydocked on 20 January, Albemarle sailed again for her original destination, San Juan, the following day.
Subsequently touching at Trinidad, British West Indies and Recife, Brazil, and retracing her path calling at Trinidad, British West Indies and San Juan on the return leg of the passage, Albemarle returned to Norfolk, Virginia on 23 February for availability. She then steamed to Casablanca in company with the amphibious command ship Catoctin (AGC-5) and two destroyers, and, among her passengers on the westward bound trip, were 20 German U-boat sailors, prisoners of war. She arrived back at Norfolk, Virginia on 1 April 1944.
After upkeep at NOB, Norfolk, Virginia, Albemarle proceeded up to the Naval Supply Depot at Bayonne, where she loaded aviation cargo, between 7 and 13 April. She then sailed, via Norfolk, Virginia, to Guantanamo Bay, Trinidad, the Brazilian ports of Recife and Bahia, and San Juan, ultimately making arrival back at Norfolk, Virginia on 27 May for voyage repairs and upkeep. Loading cargo at the end of that period, including 29 dive bombers, Albemarle again shaped a course for North African waters, the seaplane tender making arrival at Casablanca on 20 June. She proceeded thence to Avonmouth, England, where she loaded cargo and embarked passengers for return to the United States. Underway for Boston on 6 July, she reached her destination on the 13th.
Albemarle spent the next month undergoing a 30-day availability for repairs and alterations at the Boston Navy Yard. Emerging from the yard on 15 August, the seaplane tender proceeded to Bayonne, to load cargo. Sailing via Norfolk, Virginia, the ship visited the familiar bases at San Juan, Trinidad, British West Indies, Recife, Brazil and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba before returning to NOB, Norfolk, Virginia, on 29 September.
After loading cargo at Bayonne (12 to 17 October), Albemarle headed south for the supply run to San Juan, Trinidad and Recife. Outward-bound the voyage proved uneventful; however, while loading ammunition and cargo at San Juan for the return leg of the voyage, an electrical fire damaged the ship's main distribution board, putting Albemarle's lighting and ventilation systems out of commission. Underway for Hampton Roads on 22 November, the seaplane tender reached Hampton Roads on the 25th, and moored at NOB, Norfolk, Virginia, on the 26th to commence an availability.
Underway for Guantanamo Bay on the last day of 1944, Albemarle dropped anchor there on 4 January 1945. Reporting to Commander, FAW-11, for temporary duty, she tended VPB-201 and VPB-210 at "Gitmo" until 17 January, when the seaplane tender sailed for Coco Solo, Panama, Canal Zone, arriving at her destination on the 19th. Thence she sailed for Trinidad, British West Indies where she tended VPB-213 from 1 to 11 February.
Shifting back to the Canal Zone soon thereafter, Atbemarle commenced tending operations for VPB-214 at Almirante Bay, Panama, on 18 February, and remained engaged in that duty until Washington's Birthday. On 25 February, the ship was designated as flagship for Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, the day after she cleared Limon Bay for the Galapagos group.
There, Albemarle tended VPB-74 and VPB-209 from 27 February to 6 March, when the seaplane tender got underway to return to the Canal Zone. She steamed thence to Guantanamo Bay and Norfolk, Virginia, arriving at the latter place on 17 March for an availability that lasted through mid-May 1945.
Albemarle cleared Norfolk, Virginia on 18 May for New York, laden with cargo, escorted by the destroyers Bernadou (DD-153) and Dallas. Two days later, the seaplane tender sailed for the British Isles in CU-71, a convoy formed around the venerable USAT George Washington. Albemarle's mission was to bring back to the United States those patrol squadrons whose task in the Atlantic had been completed with the end of the war in Europe, and whose presence was required in the still-active Pacific theater. Ultimately, Albemarle reached her destination, Avonmouth, on 30 May, and brought her passengers—men of FAW-7 — back to Norfolk, Virginia on 14 June.
Albemarle made a second voyage to Avonmouth, sailing from Hampton Roads on Independence Day 1945 and reaching her destination on 13 July. There she embarked 772 sailors and soldiers, the majority of the latter repatriated prisoners of war. Underway on the 17th, the seaplane tender arrived back at Norfolk, Virginia on the 26th.
Entering the Norfolk, Virginia Navy Yard on 28 July for repairs and alterations to fit her out for duty in the Pacific, Albemarle was in the midst of this availability when the war in the Pacific ended in mid-August, 1945. The Japanese capitulation suspended the work; and, soon thereafter, the orders to the Pacific to tend seaplanes were cancelled.
Shortly thereafter, however, Albemarle underwent alterations of a different kind, to fit her out for different duty. With repairs carried out to the ventilation and berthing arrangements, the seaplane tender departed Norfolk, Virginia on 25 September with 2,000 Navy replacements embarked, bound for the Canal Zone. She soon reported for duty as a transport under the Naval Transport Service.
Albemarle cleared Coco Solo, Panama, Canal Zone, for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, but while transiting the Panama Canal suffered damage to her port screw. Reduced to proceeding with a single propeller, the seaplane tender put into San Francisco for repairs. Assigned to the "Magic Carpet" fleet—the ships given the job of returning American veterans home for rotation or discharge—upon completion of her repairs, Albemarle sailed westward, arriving at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 1 November before pushing on for New Caledonia, arriving there on 13 November, eventually arriving at NAS Alameda, California, on 28 November.
Following a second round-trip voyage to Samar, in the Philippines, and back, Albemarle underwent a three-month overhaul at the Naval Shipyard, Terminal Island, Calif., in preparation for her participation in Operation "Crossroads." The seaplane tender arrived at the Marshall Islands on 4 May 1946, to provide laboratory and base facilities for the technical staff for the operation. On the date of the first test (Able), an air detonation of an atomic device, Albemarle lay 155 miles to the southeast, moored in Kwajalein, Marshall Islands lagoon. Departing there on 3 July, the ship reached Bikini Atoll the following day, and, except for a rehearsal exercise on 19 July, remained moored at Bikini until she departed the lagoon there on the 25th. She observed the second test (Baker) on that day, and after spending a brief period at Bikini departed Kwajalein, Marshall Islands Atoll for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, reaching her destination on 5 August 1946, her part in "Crossroads" completed. She continued on to the west coast, reaching San Pedro on 12 August, and remained there until she sailed for Norfolk, Virginia on 29 October.
Arriving at Norfolk, Virginia via the Panama Canal on 15 November, Albemarle underwent a six-week overhaul at the Norfolk, Virginia Naval Shipyard. She remained in the Norfolk, Virginia area until she sailed on 3 March 1947 with Commander, Training Command, Atlantic, embarked. Stopping briefly at Key West, Fla., from 6 to 8 March, Albemarle proceeded on down to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, reaching her destination on 10 March for a week's operations there. Clearing "Gitmo" on 18 March, the seaplane tender returned to Norfolk, Virginia on the 21st.
Departing the Hampton Roads area on 9 April, Albemarle sailed for Boston, arriving at the naval shipyard there on the llth. She remained there until the 21 April, at which time she sailed for Newport, making arrival the same day. Departing Newport on the 23d with ComTraComdLant embarked, Albemarle returned to Norfolk, Virginia on the 24th, remaining in that vicinity, conducting refresher training and routine upkeep, until 30 June, when she sailed for Boston.
Spending the 4th of July at Boston, Albemarle remained at that port for over a month, shifting to Newport on 5 August and then back to Boston on the 14th, remaining until 2 September, when she sailed for Norfolk, Virginia. She then conducted one more trip to Newport (22 to 31 October 1947) before coming back to Norfolk, Virginia on 1 November. She then underwent a restricted availability at the Norfolk, Virginia Naval Shipyard from 1 December 1947 to 15 January 1948, for "special temporary alterations" in connection with her next operation.
Albemarle sailed from Norfolk, Virginia on 16 January 1948 for the Canal Zone, and upon completing the transit of the isthmian waterway reported for duty with Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for temporary duty with Joint Task Force "Switchman." Steaming thence to Terminal Island for final fitting out for her next task at hand, and arriving there on 4 February 1948, Albemarle sailed for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 1 March, in company with the radar picket destroyer Rogers (DDR-876), proceeding thence to the Marshall Islands, arriving at Eniwetok on 16 March, to take part in Operation "Sandstone." Specially altered for the task, Albemarle served as the laboratory ship during "Sandstone"—a three-detonation nuclear atmospheric test series— shots "X-Ray" (15 April 1948), "Yoke" (1 May 1948) and "Zebra" (15 May 1948). Departing Eniwetok on 21 May 1948, Albemarle arrived at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on the 27th, en route to Oakland, Calif., which she reached on 4 June. Sailing for Norfolk, Virginia on 11 June, she transited the Panama Canal on 20-21 June, and reached her ultimate destination on the 26th. She remained there undergoing overhaul at the Norfolk, Virginia Naval Shipyard until 23 August, when she sailed for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, reaching "Gitmo" on the 27th for a three-day stay. Over the two weeks following her departure from Cuban waters, Albemarle visited Key West, Boston, and Newport before returning to Norfolk, Virginia on 14 September.
Following an overhaul at Norfolk, Virginia Naval Shipyard, Albemarle stood out of Hampton Roads on 8 February, and over the ensuing weeks visited a succession of ports and operating areas: Key West; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; Kingston, Jamaica; and Bermuda, interspersing these port visits with training out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Returning to the Norfolk, Virginia Naval Base on 19 March, she remained there into the summer, ultimately sailing for Boston on 13 July for a port visit. Subsequently visiting Newport and New York, Albemarle returned to Norfolk, Virginia on 27 July, and worked in the local operating areas into September. Further operations late in the summer and early fall of 1949 took the ship to Newport, New York, and the Norfolk, Virginia local operating areas. Standing out of Lynnhaven Roads on 2 March 1950, Albemarle subsequently worked out of Vieques, Puerto Rico, and Roosevelt Roads before she visited Martinique'\15-17 March 1950), Grenada (17-19 March), Willemstad, Curacao (20-22 March), and Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic (23-25 March). Stopping briefly at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the ship returned to Norfolk, Virginia on 31 March and remained there until 11 May, when she got underway for the New York Naval Shipyard, arriving there the following day. Attached to the New York Group, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, the ship was decommissioned on 14 August 1950 and berthed at Brooklyn.
Shifted to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in February 1956, Albemarle was earmarked for conversion to tend Martin P6M "Seamaster" jet flying boats. She was reassigned from the Atlantic Reserve Fleet to the Commandant, 4th Naval District, for conversion, effective 6 February 1956. Equipped with stern ramps and servicing booms to handle the "Seamaster," as well as a semi-sheltered area and a service drydock, the ship emerged from the conversion possessing the capability to serve as a highly mobile seadrome capable of supporting jet seaplanes anywhere. Albemarle was recommissioned at Philadelphia on 21 October 1957, Capt. William A. Dean in command. After fitting out, she sailed for Norfolk, Virginia on 7 December, and arrived there on the 10th. The ship then sailed for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on 3 January 1958, made port there on the 7th, remaining there for ten days and carrying out shakedown training, before dropping down to Montego Bay, Jamaica. Proceeding thence back to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, concluding her shakedown on 21 January, Albemarle steamed thence to San Juan and Trinidad, carrying out tending operations with four squadrons of Martin P5M "Marlin" flying boats and participating in "Springboard" exercises. Albemarle arrived back at Norfolk, Virginia on 9 April, remaining there only five days before proceeding back to Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, where she remained under overhaul through mid-July. Returning to Norfolk, Virginia on 20 July, the ship got underway for operations in the North Atlantic on 14 August, and ranged as far as the Azores before returning to Norfolk, Virginia on 16 September. Over the next two months, Albemarle operated between Norfolk, Virginia and Bermuda; she rounded out the year at Norfolk, Virginia, arriving there on 19 November and remaining until 2 March 1959.
Albemarle continued to operate out of Norfolk, Virginia through 1959 and into 1960, although the cancellation of the "Seamaster" program meant that the ship would never service the aircraft for which she had been reconfigured. Her ports and places visited in 1959 encompassed the naval air facility at Patuxent River, Maryland; Pillsbury Sound, in the Virgin Islands; San Juan, and Savannah, Ga.; Halifax and Nova Scotia, Canada; New York City; York-town, Va., Port-au-Prince; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Bermuda. The ship commenced the year, 1960, operating out of San Juan, then moved in succession to Bermuda, back to San Juan, thence to Pillsbury Sound and Grand Turk Island, in the West Indies, thence to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Pillsbury Sound again; thence to San Juan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into March.
Unloading ammunition at the Naval Weapons Station at York-town, between 12 and 15 July, Albemarle moored at Norfolk, Virginia, commencing preparations for inactivation, from 15 to 18 July, before she proceeded to Philadelphia to unload material. Returning thence to Norfolk, Virginia on 30 July, she continued inactivation preparations through the summer.
Placed out of commission, in reserve, on 21 October 1960, Albemarle was initially berthed with the Norfolk, Virginia group of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet pending her transfer to the Maritime Administration (MarAd) James River Fleet. Placed in the custodial care of MarAd, Albemarle was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 1 September 1962.
On 7 August 1964, however, MarAd transferred the ship— earmarked for conversion to a floating aeronautical maintenance facility for helicopters—back to the Navy. On 27 March 1965, the ship received the new name and classification Corpus Christi Bay (T-ARVH-1), and was transferred to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) on 11 January 1966.
Converted at the Charleston (S.C.) Naval Shipyard, the ship emerged from the yard only faintly resembling her former self. Gone was the prominent seaplane ramp, aft, replaced by a built-up superstructure topped by a helicopter landing pad measuring 50 by 150 feet. Previously, damaged helicopters had had to be transported back to the United States for refit; with the advent of this "new" ship type, repairs could be accomplished near the forward areas, damaged helos barged out to the ship and lifted on board by two 20-ton capacity cranes.
Accepted by MSC in January 1966, Corpus Christi Bay's first commander was Capt. Harry Anderson, who had a crew of 129 men, a fraction of the ship's original complement, under him. Accompanying the ship on her first deployment in support of forces in Vietnam was the Army's 1st Transportation Corps Battalion (Seaborne), 308 aircraft technicians and specialists under the command of Lt. Col. Harry 0. Davis, USA. The ship operated out of Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam, during 1966.
Ultimately determined by MSC to be "in excess of current and future requirements," Corpus Christi Bay was taken out of service and berthed in ready reserve status at Corpus Christi, Texas. Corpus Christi Bay (T-ARVH-1) was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 31 December 1974. On 17 July 1975, the ship was sold to Brownsville (Texas) Steel and Salvage, Inc., and was scrapped subsequently.
USS Albemarle USS Albemarle (AV-5), 30 July 1943, in what is probably Measure 21 (Navy blue/haze gray) camouflage. (80-G-76629)
USS Albemarle USS Albemarle (AV-5), her stem showing the extensive modifications made to enable her to handle the projected Martin PGM "Seamaster" flying boats, in the Azores, 21 August 1958, in this photograph taken by Chief Photographer Leuko. (USN 1044231)
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...VP-94 "CRAWFISHERS" ..." http://www.navy-reserve.org/magazine/9805/nra9805b.html [02MAY99] Patrol Squadron NINE FOUR (VP-94), commanded by CDR Russ Granier, is based in New Orleans, LA. The squadron's goal is to provide a versatile, cost-effective, multi-mission force which fulfills key requirements in every scenario envisioned in the Navy's "Forward...
From the Sea" strategy. To maintain and enhance operational effectiveness, VP-94 routinely operates P-3C aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans.
Our vision is to effectively use the long endurance and multi-mission capabilities of the P-3C to support joint operations in the littoral environment and to integrate into the tailored force package of the operational commander.
VP-94 was commissioned on 3 March, 1942 as VPB-94 at Norfolk, VA and participated in numerous campaigns during World War II. The squadron recorded eight attacks on enemy submarines and was credited with three probable sinkings in the month of July, 1943. VPB-94 was recommissioned as VP-94 on 1 November 1970 in conjunction with the implementation of the Naval Air Reserve concept. The squadron was nicknamed the CRAWFISHERS. Person-nel to man the newly reformed unit were drawn from NAS New Orleans, and NAS Dallas. VP-94 would operate under the direction of Commander Reserve Patrol Wing Atlantic.
From recommissioning through August 1976, VP-94 operated the Lockheed SP-2H Neptune aircraft. The squadron has since operated Lockheed P-3A, P-3B, and P-3B TACNAVMOD aircraft. Currently, the Craw-fishers fly the P-3C Update II.5 aircraft. The P-3C is the world standard in Maritime Patrol Aircraft; identical to the platforms being operated by the active duty Navy. Over the years, VP-94 has conducted Annual Training (AT) deployments from numerous sites, including NAS Bermuda; NAF Lajes, Azores; NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii; NS Rota, Spain; NAS Sigonella, Italy; NS Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico and NAS North Island, California, NAF Misawa, Japan and NAF Kadena, Japan. As an example of how much the CRAWFISHERS "Get Around" , during AT in 1983, the squadron successfully flew operational flights from five remote sites on the same day.
From 1986 to 1990, the squadron deployed to NS Rota, Spain while operating detachments from four different sites. 1987 was especially rewarding as the CRAWFISHERS received the coveted Noel Davis Battle "E" Trophy as well as the CNO Safety Award and CRPWL Administrative Excellence Award. From 1990 through 1992 the CRAWFISHERS participated in Counter-Narcotics missions, operating out of NAS Key West, Florida and NAS Bermuda. This was the first time a reserve Patrol Squadron operated as PATRON Bermuda.
1993 marked the beginning of a new era in reserve VP operations: the transition to a flexible detachment concept. This included the full-time contributory support of CTF/CTG commitments. Interoperability between USN and USNR forward deployed forces reached new levels of excellence. In the summer of 1993, VP-94 flew armed missions in support of Operation Maritime Guard/Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea, enforcing the U.N. embargo against the former Yugoslavian Republics. The CRAWFISHERS assisted in limited embargo operations against the military regime in Haiti, conducting sorties from NS Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico in support of Operation Support Democracy/Able Manner. The CRAWFISHERS earned the Coast Guard Meritorious Ribbon for this operation.
On 1 April 1994, VP-94 came under the operational control of CRPWP located at Moffett Federal Airfield, California. In 1996 the squadron deployed to NAF Misawa and NAF Kadena, Japan. The squadron also participated in a live Harpoon missile shoot while detached to NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii. Most recently VP-94 detached to NAS North Island, California in April 1997 in support of our nation's drug interdiction policy. To date, VP-94 has completed over 25 years of accident free flying and over 84,000 flight hours./strong>
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...I was in the original VP-94 which was commissioned 3 March 1942. It was decommissioned 22 December 1944. The 15 Catalinas were turned over to the Brazilian Air Force and at least three of them are still up and around.
The current VP-94 which is stationed in New Orleans was commissioned around 1969 and is still going strong. That squadron had a 25th annual reunion in 1994 and they invited any survivors of the original VP-94 to join in the event. We were able to get together 7 of us (museum pieces) to attend and we were wined dined and toasted by a great bunch of guys.
We operated all along the coast of Brazil with small groups of planes working out of various cities along the coast as needed for Convoy coverage etc. We were quite similar to the M.A.S.H. which we have all seen on TV. However we never had a still. Great Brazilian beer was always available in the nearby village or city.
As I mentioned in my previous message we were able to sink 2 U-boats. The U-590 on 9 July 1943 which went down with no survivors and the U-662 on 21 July 1943. 44 men went down with that u-boat however the captain and 3 crew members survived and were picked up at sea after 17 days.
In talking with many of the men from our squadron, we now do not feel good about that loss of life. With peace now enjoyed by our country and Germany many of us would prefer that all of them survived...." Contributed by John B Sargent jbsarg@Juno.com [09JUN98]
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Patrol Squadron 94 was commissioned on 3 March 1942 in Norfolk, VA and participated in numerous campaigns during World War II. Flying the PBY "Catalina", the squadron recorded eight attacks on enemy submarines off the Brazilian coast and was credited with three sinkings. VP-94 was redesignated as VPB-94 on 1 October 1944 and was disestablished two months later. The ''Crawfishers'' were re-commissioned on 1 November 1970 in conjunction with the implementation of the Naval Air Reserve. At re-commissioning, the squadron operated Lockheed SP-2H "Neptune" aircraft. In 1976, the squadron transitioned to the Lockheed P-3A "Orion" aircraft. In 1984, the squadron transitioned to the P-3B (MOD) "Super Bee", and in 1995, to the P-3C. The advanced weapons systems in this aircraft use computers to assist aircrews in detecting, localizing, tracking, and attacking surface, subsurface and land targets. Annual Training detachments have been performed at Bermuda, Hawaii, Italy, Puerto Rico, San Diego, Spain, Japan and NAS New Orleans, Louisiana. Squadron detachments also participate in major fleet exercises and have aided in drug interdiction efforts throughout the Caribbean Sea, Mexico and Panama. The squadron includes both men and women, and numbers seven active duty officers, 64 selected reserve officers, 118 active duty enlisted personnel, and 146 selected reserve enlisted personnel..." http://members.aol.com/StevenV113/VP-94/home.htm
Circa 1941-1945
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...History of FAW-9 - History from 00MAY41-00JAN45 Submitted June 19th, 1945. Squadron's Assigned: VP-31, VP-52, VP-81, VP-82, VP-91, VP-92, VP-93, VP-94, VP-128..." Official U. S. Navy Records (National Archives and Records Administration) via Fold3 http://www.fold3.com/ [02DEC2012]
Circa 1941
A BIT OF HISTORY: "...Hearings Before The Joint Committee On The Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress Of The United States - Seventy-Ninth Congress...Squadrons mentioned: VP-11, VP-13, VP-14, VP-21, VP-22, VP-23, VP-24, VP-31, VP-32, VP-41, VP-42, VP-43, VP-44, VP-51, VP-52, VP-71, VP-72, VP-73, VP-74, VP-81, VP-82, VP-83, VP-84, VP-91, VP-92, VP-93, VP-94, VP-101, VP-102, CPW-1, CPW-2, CPW-3, CPW-4, CPW-5, CPW-7, CPW-8 and CPW-9..." WebSite: The public's library and digital archive http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html [01APR2005]
Hearings Before The Joint Committee On the Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack 333KB
"VP-94 History Summary Page"
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